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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents essays on the relationship between judgment and de-
cision making and public policy, with a focus on gender diversity. The gender
di erence in career advancement is the likely result both of decisions made on the
supply side (i.e. female and male job candidates) as well as decisions on the demand
side (i.e. evaluators). These essays explore the behavioral foundations of decision
making processes on both sides, and also make recommendations on how to use
these behavioral insights to improve decisions, as well as increase gender diversity.
The first essay, Opening the Black Box of Gender Di erences in Risk Taking, ex-
perimentally tests the drivers behind increased risk aversion of females. The essay
demonstrates that this gender di erence is not driven by di erences in probability
weighting but by di erences in the valuation of outcomes. In addition, in environ-
ments where probabilities and outcomes are not common knowledge, females expect
a higher chance of a bad outcome to occur, and dislike the bad outcome more. Con-
trolling for the expected probabilities and the valuation of outcomes eliminates the
gender di erence in risk preferences, except for monetary risks.
The second essay, Risk in the Background: How Men and Women Respond, ex-
perimentally tests the gender-specific e ect of risk in the decision environment on
subsequent risk taking. It demonstrates that females increase risk taking after an
increase in income and in the presence of an unrealized risk with strictly positive
iii
potential outcomes, but there are no such e ects for males. Males increase risk
taking after winning a lottery, while females do not.
The third essay, When Performance Trumps Gender Bias, proposes a new inter-
vention to overcome gender bias in hiring: an “evaluation nudge” in which people are
evaluated jointly rather than separately. It demonstrates that evaluators are more
likely to base their decisions on individual performance in joint than in separate
evaluation and on group stereotypes in separate than in joint evaluation, making
the proposed intervention the profit-maximizing evaluation procedure.
iv
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1. Executive Summary
Young boys and young girls continue to have very di erent professional futures
lying ahead of them. Even in the modern societies that pride themselves on the
legal enforcement of equal rights and opportunities, women on average make lower
wages, are less likely to receive promotions, and are less likely to reach positions of
power. This holds in politics and business, as well as in academia. To understand
why women continue to have a smaller voice, and thus a smaller impact, in the
shaping of our present and future, we have to consider both the demand and the
supply side of labor.
On the supply side, females may behave di erently than males do in ways that
makes them less geared for professional success. There are many reasons for gender
di erences in behavior, including di erences in preferences, opportunities, expec-
tations, capacities or inclinations. On the demand side, females may be in lower
demand for positions of power if employers expect females to have lower potential
or if employers inherently prefer to not work with females. Demand and supply
are not independent: the expectations and decisions of employers will be influenced
by gender di erences in behavior and performance, and will in turn also a ect the
decisions of potential employees.
In economics there is growing awareness that decision makers often do not succeed
in making rational and optimal decisions. Human beings are a ected by biases and
heuristics, oftentimes without realizing this. This implies that decisions cannot al-
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ways be trusted to be reflections of a successful utility maximization process. Biases
and heuristics can keep the individual from making the decisions that maximize his
or her welfare. From an economic perspective, this implies an ine ciency. These
behavioral tendencies also have implications for gender diversity in employment.
For example on the demand side, if employers have no desire to discriminate but
do so unconsciously because they are driven by heuristics or biases beyond their
control, this can keep employers from hiring the best candidate, as well as keeping
the best candidate from developing her full potential. Similarly, on the supply side,
if it is behavioral tendencies and not preferences that keeps females from choosing
directions that would prove fruitful for them, this is an ine ciency.
This dissertation presents three essays concerned with the relationship between
gender, bounded rationality, and decision making. All three essays use experimental
methods to determine hurdles for attaining gender diversity. The first two essays
take the supply side perspective and yield insights in what is driving gender di er-
ences in risk preferences. The focus of the third essay is on the demand side and
proposes and tests an intervention based on behavioral insights to reduce the impact
of biases and heuristics of employers in their evaluation of job candidates.
The first essay, Opening the Black Box of Gender Di erences in Risk Taking, uses
experiments with a large range of risk attitude elicitation procedures to establish the
nature of gender di erences in risk aversion. The essay demonstrates that females
are more risk averse in most, but not all, contexts. The gender di erence for risk
taking in the financial context is especially pronounced. The gender di erence in
risk aversion is driven by risk aversion over the potential outcomes associated with
a risk and not by a gender di erence in the weighting of the objective probabilities
associated with the outcomes. There are two additional sources for higher risk
aversion of females in situations where outcomes and probabilities are not objectively
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known. In these instances decision makers have to rely on their own judgments
and expectations to estimate the risk, and females are more pessimistic about the
likelihood that the good outcome will occur, and expect higher disutility when the
low outcome occurs. These gender di erences in risk aversion cannot be explained by
di erences in cognitive capacities, expected future income, anxiety, or self-reported
overconfidence and optimism.
The second essay, Risk in the Background: How Men and Women Respond, builds
on the first essay and investigates gender di erences in the e ect of risk in the
decision environment. In particular it studies how the presence of unrealized risk
and realizations of risk a ect subsequent risk preferences. The essay demonstrates
that there are stark gender di erences. Females increase risk taking after an increase
in income and in the presence of an unrealized risk with strictly positive potential
outcomes, but there are no such e ects for males. Males increase risk taking after
winning a lottery, while females do not. The essay illustrates that risk preferences
as well as gender di erences in risk preferences are not static. Taken as a whole,
the results are consistent with those that argue for a testosterone mediated e ect
of winning on risk preferences; they are also in line with decision models in which
higher baseline risk aversion implies increased income sensitivity.
The third essay, When Performance Trumps Gender Bias: Joint Versus Separate
Evaluation, is joint work with Iris Bohnet and Max Bazerman. This essay fits in
the strand of research that uses behavioral insights to design policies to improve
decision making. It proposes a new intervention to overcome gender bias in hiring,
promotion, and job assignments: an “evaluation nudge” in which candidates are
evaluated jointly rather than separately regarding their future performance. This
intervention is inspired by findings in behavioral decision research suggesting that
people make more rational choices when examining products jointly rather than
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separately. The intervention succeeds in making evaluators more likely to base
their decisions on individual performance than on group stereotypes, and enables
employers to make profit-maximizing decisions.
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2. Opening the Black Box of Gender
Di erences in Risk Taking
2.1. Introduction
Studies have found females to be more risk averse than males in a large set of
contexts and elicitation procedures, but we know little about what is causing this
di erence. Risk attitude is known to a ect many important economic decisions - in-
cluding financial investments and occupation choice - and therefore has far reaching
consequences, including on a person’s expected earnings (Bonin et al., 2007) and his
likelihood of financial ruin. It is important to understand whether the increased risk
aversion of females, and the reduced risk aversion of males is an expression of be-
havioral tendencies, such as biases and heuristics, or if it is the result of underlying
preferences. If behavioral tendencies are responsible, this may be a motivation for
policy makers to step in. A mapping of the drivers behind this gender gap in risk
preferences may then inform us about the appropriate tools to address this ’behav-
ioral’ risk aversion and its potential consequences, such as the under-representation
of females in high paying occupations, or the increased likelihood of bankruptcy for
male entrepreneurs (Agarwal et al., 2013).
In a world of known outcomes and probabilities there are three main sources of
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risk averse choices. Firstly, they can occur because of concave utility over outcomes.
In the presence of diminishing utility over earnings - represented by a concave utility
function - fair bets will be rejected. Risk averse people are willing to give up the
potential of receiving a good outcome in order to prevent the bad outcome from
happening. This behavior is conform with rational preferences, such as stipulated
in Expected Utility Theory. We know from behavioral research that people do not
just care about absolute changes in earnings, but also care how they relate to a
reference point. For gains the concave utility function over outcomes appears to be
a pretty accurate description. but for losses not so much. Research suggests that we
have a strong aversion to losing and will accept a lower certainty equivalent in order
to prevent the possibility of a state of loss (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). For risks
that involve the possibility to lose money as compared to the reference point, loss
aversion can be an additional source of risk averse decisions. Thirdly, risk aversion
can occur through the weighting of probabilities. Behavioral research suggests that
people do not weight probabilities linearly and that probability weighting can be a
driver behind risk averse choices. For example, if people overweight the probability
associated with the bad outcome in a particular risk, this will result in more risk
averse decisions. An environment with unknown outcomes and probabilities can
give rise to an additional source of risk aversion. If decision makers do not know
the objective outcomes and probabilities they have to rely on their expectations.
These estimates can be biased, for example when people are too optimistic about
the probability of the good outcome to occur, this can increase risk taking.
I employ experiments to examine gender di erences in these drivers of risk aver-
sion. Using incentivized lottery based risk attitude elicitation methods covering
positive outcome, mixed outcome and negative outcome lotteries I test for gender
di erences in risk aversion over outcomes, risk aversion through probability weight-
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ing, as well as loss aversion. Subjects also participate in the Dospert task in order to
test for an additional e ect of expectations. This task features a decision environ-
ment where outcomes and probabilities are not experimentally imposed, allowing me
to compare subjects’ stated willingness to take a particular risk with their expecta-
tions of the potential outcomes and the associated probabilities. The task features
risky decisions involving financial, ethical, health, ethical, gambling as well a social
contexts, enabling me to test for gender specific context e ects on risk preferences.
I find that females are generally more risk averse, except for risks in a social
or ethical context. Risk aversion through outcomes and expectations appear to
be the two responsible drivers. For lotteries involving strictly positive outcomes
I find significant gender di erences in risk aversion over outcomes, with females
being more risk averse than males. I find no gender di erences in risk aversion
over outcomes for the other lotteries: Females are not less risk loving for lotteries
involving the negative domain and do not display more loss aversion when evaluating
mixed lotteries. There is also no gender di erence in probability weighting. In the
environments were outcomes and probabilities are not experimentally imposed and
subjects have to rely on their expectations, females’ increased pessimism reduces
their risk taking. The monetary context is special both because the gender gap in
risk preferences is most pronounced and because this gap cannot be fully explained
by expectations or by risk aversion over outcomes (and not by risk aversion through
probability weighting or loss aversion either). This residual gap in risk preferences
is consistent with gender specific expressions of biases, heuristics, or process utility
in the financial context.
I consider a number of explanations to understand what may give rise to these
gender di erences in risk preferences. I test for an e ect of overconfidence and
optimism since if females are less overconfident or optimistic this may negatively
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e ect their expectations as well as their tolerance to risk. I also test for an e ect of
anxiety and an e ect of cognitive reflection or proficiency with probabilities as these
may have a similar e ect on risk preferences. I consider an e ect of income, as lower
expected income of females may imply increased risk aversion in the presence of
decreasing absolute risk aversion. Although I find significant di erences in reported
optimism, overconfidence, expected future income, as well as experimentally elicited
cognitive reflection, proficiency with probabilities and anxiety, these traits cannot
significantly explain the gender di erences in risk aversion over outcomes or the
gender di erences in risk aversion through expectations.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the conceptual framework.
Section III describes the experimental design, Section IV reports the experimental
results and Section V concludes.
2.2. Conceptual Framework
The economic theory on risk preferences has become an increasingly complicated
one. Expected Utility Theory has an elegant explanation for risk aversion by allow-
ing rational agents to have concave utility functions over wealth. Behavioral insights
have forced theorists to develop alternative models that allow for non-linear proba-
bility weighting and for reference point dependence. As outlined in the introduction
these behavioral tendencies can give rise to additional drivers of risk aversion. In
this paper we consider 5 potential drivers of risk preference.
Driver 1: Females are more risk averse because of diminishing marginal utility
over earnings. Risk preferences may di er because females have more concave utility
functions over wealth or experimental earnings than males do. The concavity of the
utility function plays an important role in many decision models including Expected
Utility Theory, Expected Utility over Income, and is also consistent with Prospect
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Theory’s description valuation over gains.1
Driver 2: Females are more risk averse because they are more intolerant towards
potential losses than males are. The ability to account for loss aversion is an im-
portant part of the appeal for Prospect Theory. The aversion to losses may cause
people to accept lower certainty equivalents. When females are more loss averse
than males this will result in reduced tolerance for mixed outcome risks.
Driver 3: Females are more risk averse because of the way they weight the prob-
abilities associated with the outcomes of the risk. Behavioral research suggest that
probabilities are not weighted linearly, in certain situations this may a ect risk pref-
erences. Probability weighting is therefore an additional potential driver of gender
di erences in risk preferences.
Lottery based risk attitude elicitation tasks allow us to experimentally identify
the gender di erences in risk aversion through all three channels, but this does
require the inclusion of negative and mixed outcome lotteries. The inclusion of
negative and mixed lotteries is di cult from an experimental perspective, as we
generally do not want subjects to become worse o  because of the experiment. Most
research on gender di erence in risk preferences has therefore focused on decisions
involving lotteries with strictly positive outcomes, and is unable to determine the
e ects of probability weighting and loss aversion on risk preferences. These studies
overwhelmingly find females to be more risk averse (for overviews see Eckel and
Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) on the positive domain although this
di erence is less pronounced for Swedish children and for girls from single-sex schools
1Risk aversion through the valuation of outcomes refers to the second order risk preference over
outcomes. Higher order risk attitudes - such as prudence, edginess and especially temperance-
may also a ect risk taking. (Noussair and Trautmann, 2011) study the e ect of these higher
order risk attitudes on risk taking and find that temperance predicts the riskiness of portfolio
choices. Temperance refers to vulnerability to background risk and is implied by decreasing
absolute risk aversion. The findings on gender di erences in higher order risk preferences is not
robust, with some studies reporting no gender di erences in temperance (Deck and Schlesinger,
2012)and some reporting higher temperance for females (Ebert and Wiesen, 2010).
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(Cárdenas et al., 2012; Nolen and Booth, 2012). There has been little research on
gender di erences in preferences for negative outcome and mixed outcome gambles,
but in risks framed as losses results are inconclusive, with sometimes females being
less risk averse than males (Brachinger et al., 2000; Eckel and Grossman, 2008;
Powell and Ansic, 1997). Fehr Duda et al. (2006) is one of the few that examines
gender di erences in probability weighting. They study a large variety of risky
gambles and overall they find no significant gender di erence in the probability
weighting function. They do find that women appear to be less sensitive to changes
in probabilities and that females are more pessimistic in the positive domain, but
there is no gender di erence in the e ect on probability weights.
Driver 4: Females are more risk averse because they have more pessimistic ex-
pectations than males. In environments where probabilities and outcomes are not
common knowledge, subjects are to rely on their own expectations. In as far as
these expectations di er across genders this may give rise to an additional source of
gender di erences in risk preferences. Males are generally found to be more overcon-
fident and optimistic (Barber and Odean, 2001; Reuben et al., 2013; Gysler et al.,
2002) and this may a ect their willingness to accept risk. Lottery based risk atti-
tude elicitation tasks are not suitable for testing the e ects of expectations. Harris
et al. (2006) use the Dospert task to measure the e ect of expectations and prob-
abilities on risk taking in four contexts (health, gambling, recreational and social)
and find that expectations do indeed di ers across genders, with females generally
being pessimistic both in the expected outcomes as well as in probabilities. Gender
di erences in expectations and valuations do explain part of the gender gap in risk
preferences, but do not explain all of it. It is possible that their particular approach
(inquiring about expected probabilities using a 5 point likert-scale, rather than ac-
tual probabilities) did not allow them to capture the full e ect of expectations. But
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there is also the possibility that this part of the gender di erence in risk taking is
not driven by di erences in the perception of probabilities and outcomes.
Driver 5: Females are more risk averse because of reasons that are not related with
the perception of the outcomes and likelihood of the risk. There are other factors that
can a ect risk preferences. For example, even when a particular risky behavior that
is presented to us is objectively enjoyable, our norms or ethics may prevent us from
taking risk. In a lot of cultures gambling is considered inappropriate, taking ethical
risks may be unacceptable from a moral point of view. Alternatively, the process
of risk taking in a domain may be enjoyable to us irrespective of the outcomes and
the probabilities. We enjoy gambling partly for the process, some of us may enjoy
actively investing for the same reason. These ’other’ factors may represent norms,
biases and heuristics, or process utility. These factors may di er across genders, for
example if our beliefs on what constitutes acceptable behavior di ers across genders,
such as when investment is considered a stereotypically male behavior.
The next section will discuss how the experimental design enables me to determine
the importance of each of these factors.
2.3. Experimental Design
160 students were recruited from the subject pool of the Harvard Decision Science
Laboratory at Harvard University. 50% of subjects were male, about 2/3 were
American, the average age was 21-22 years, and a bit more than half were Caucasian.
The show up fee was $10. All subjects were identified by code numbers and remained
anonymous. The experiments were programmed and conducted with the software
Z-Tree Fischbacher (2007).
Subjects started with a risk attitude elicitation task that is an adaptation of the
Dospert Survey that was developed and validated by Blais et al. (2002). In this task
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subjects reported the likelihood of partaking in risky activities in several contexts
(i.e. financial, social, recreational, gambling and health). Similar to Harris et al.
(2006) subjects also stated the expected probability for the good outcome to occur
and scale their valuation of the good outcome and the bad outcome. Di erent from
Harris et al. (2006) we did not use a Likert scale but asked subjects to report the
actual expected probabilities, in addition we inquired about the perceived riskiness
of the activity, and included risks with a financial and ethical context. This task
enables us to estimate the e ect of expectations (Driver 4) as well as the e ect
of drivers not related to expectations or valuations of outcomes (Driver 5 ). The
instructions for the first task are reported in the Appendix.
After the Dospert Survey subjects participated in additional survey based tasks
that informed us about several personal characteristics. Notably, subjects partici-
pated in the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV, a questionnaire used in
clinical settings to diagnose generalized anxiety disorder (Cashman-McGrath et al.,
2002). Thereafter they participated in a Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005)
and the Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely et al., 2012) to measure cognitive reflection
and risk literacy.2 Instructions are in the Appendix.3
Next all subjects participated in the second risk attitude elicitation task to esti-
mate the e ect of risk aversion over outcomes (Driver 1 ), loss aversion (Driver 2 )
as well risk aversion through probability weighting (Driver 3 ). This lottery based
elicitation method is similar to Abdellaoui et al. (2011) with the exception that I
also include mixed-outcome and negative-outcome lotteries. Subjects could earn a
2These survey based tasks took about 45 minutes to complete and all subject received $15 for
their time.
3At this point, subjects were assigned to one of 4 treatments and depending on the treatment
they now receive either a certain sum of $2 (T1) , $30 (T2) , $0 (T3) or an uncertain sum
represented by a lottery that yields either $2 or $30 both with 50% probability (T4) (for a
more detailed description see van Geen (2014)). These treatments are not the focus of the
present study, but throughout the analysis we will control for gender specific treatment e ects.
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maximum of $15 and lose a maximum of $15. The task comprises 15 lists of 7 deci-
sions, each list being associated with one particular lottery, with a fixed probability
for the high outcome and the low outcome to occur. In each of the 7 decisions,
the lottery is contrasted with a di erent fixed sum. The lowest fixed sum equals
the lowest possible lottery outcome, and the highest fixed sum equals the highest
possible outcome. After subjects made their decisions, one of the 15x7 decisions is
randomly selected for payment. (See the Appendix for a screenshot of one of the
lottery lists in the lottery list task). This method is found to be more tractable and
less sensitive to the bias that is associated with procedures that rely on comparing
non-degenerate lotteries (Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre, 2012; Abdellaoui et al.,
2011).
Thereafter all subjects participated in a hypothetical large stake gamble task,
as in Anderson and Mellor (2009) featuring questions on the willingness to make
a risky investment in the scenario of a recently acquired inheritance. Anderson
and Mellor (2009) find risk attitudes derived through this method to be correlated
both with real life risk taking and with risk attitudes elicited from incentivized
low stake lottery based decision tasks. This task serves as an additional check for
the empirical validity of our results in the lottery based risk elicitation task which
-because of financial constraints- has relatively low stakes.
Next all subjects were informed about the selected decision in the second risk
attitude elicitation task, the outcome of the associated lottery, and their payo s
and participated in an additional task.4 Most important for us they filled out a
short demographic questionnaire that included questions on expected future income,
parental income, self-reported risk aversion, loss aversion, confidence, optimism and
4 Subjects in T4 learned of the outcome of the lottery.
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their gender. The total experiment took about 1.5 hours.
2.4. Results: Drivers of Gender Di erences in Risk
Preferences
2.4.1. Drivers of risk taking in environments where outcomes
and probabilities are common knowledge
Tab. 2.1 depicts the risk preferences in the lottery list task by gender. Males are
about 20% less risk averse in the positive domain (F1,159 = 3.97, p < 0.05) and
about 16% less risk averse in the mixed domain, but this is not significant (F1,159 =
1.53, p = 0.22). The reduction in the gender di erence in risk aversion for lotteries
in the mixed domain implies that is there is no evidence for increased loss aversion
(Driver 2 ) of females. There is no gender di erence in the negative domain (F1,159 =
1.08, p = 0.30).
Table 2.1.: Risk Preferences in Lottery List Task: Nr of Safe Choices
Male Female
Positive domain 14.154*** 18.308 ***
(0.907) (1.879)
Mixed domain 14.308*** 17***
(1.173) (1.837)
Negative domain 21.077*** 22.462***
(0.944) (0.944)
Number of choices for the safe option in the Lottery List Task
by domain. Linear regression controlling for gender specific
treatment e ects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.***
Significance at the 1 percent level ** Significant at the 5 per-
cent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
The design of the first risk attitude elicitation task allows us to further explore
the origin of this gender di erence in risk aversion. In Tab. 2.2 I first estimate
14
a CRRA power utility function for the lotteries on the positive domain so that
u(x) = x(1≠a)/(1 ≠ a), whilst controlling for gender and treatment e ects. In this
function a reflects the coe cient of relative risk aversion, with a > 0 indicating
risk aversion. The results are displayed in the first row of Tab. 2.2. The second
row of Tab. 2.2 depicts the estimates of a power utility function for the lotteries on
the negative domain with u(x) = ≠(≠x)(1≠b)/(1 ≠ b), for which b> 0 reflects risk
lovingness in the negative domain. The results indicate that females are significantly
more risk averse in the positive domain (‰2(1) = 6.86, p = 0.01.), and significantly
less risk loving in the negative domain (‰2(1) = 3.71, p = 0.05.)
Table 2.2.: Risk Preferences in Lottery List Task: EUT Specification
Male Female
Positive domain (a) 0.368*** 0.643***
(0.076) (0.073)
Negative domain (b) 0.656*** 0.459***
(0.065) (0.079)
Maximum likelihood Estimates of baseline CRRA (a)on the
positive domain and risk lovingness (b) on the negative do-
main. Controlling for treatment e ects, gender and treatment
interactions, Clustered standard errors in parentheses.*** Sig-
nificance at the 1 percent level ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Next I allow for probabilistic risk aversion (Driver 3 ) and estimate a RDEUmodel.
Results are reported in Tab. 2.3. The estimates of a and b can be interpreted as risk
aversion and risk lovingness in the positive and negative domain respectively. w is
the weighting of the probability that the low outcome occurs. In the positive domain
the objective probability of the low outcome is 0.25, and in the negative domain
the probability of the low (most negative) outcome is 0.75. The estimates of a in
the first row of Tab. 2.3 show that in the positive domain females are significantly
more risk averse over outcomes (‰2(1) = 3.59, p = 0.06.) In absolute terms the
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coe cient of relative risk aversion is 0.22 higher for females, implying a coe cient
of relative risk aversion for females that is 187% of that of males. The estimates
in the second row of Tab. 2.3 are indicative of risk aversion in probabilities in the
positive domain: both genders overweight the probability that the low outcome
occurs. In the negative domain there is again overweighting of the probability of
the low outcome, suggesting that there is risk aversion in probabilities even when
there is risk lovingness over outcomes. We find no gender di erence in probability
weighting in the positive domain (‰2(1) = 0.22, p = 0.64.). Across genders these
estimates of risk aversion over outcomes and probabilities in the positive domain are
similar to Abdellaoui et al. (2011)
In the negative domain the absolute di erence for the coe cient of relative risk
aversion is about 0.23 but this is not significant (‰2(1) = 2.18, p = 0.14) and there
is again no significant gender di erence in the weighting of probabilities (‰2(1) =
0.01, p = 0.93.)
Table 2.3.: Risk Preferences in Lottery List Task, RDEU Specification
Male Female
Positive domain
a 0.251*** 0.469***
(0.083) (0.081)
w 1.398*** 1.545***
(0.144) (0.279)
Negative domain
b 0.465*** 0.240 ***
(0.267) (0.097)
w 1.702 *** 1.732***
(0.234) (0.214)
Maximum likelihood estimates of CRRA value function of
RDEU modelon the positive domain and the negative do-
main. w is probability of thelow outcome (p=0.25 on the
positive domain, p=0.75 on the negative domain.) Con-
trolling for treatment e ects, gender and treatment interac-
tions, Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** Signif-
icance at the 1 percent level.
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2.4.2. Drivers of risk taking in environments where outcomes
and probabilities are not common knowledge
Tab. 2.4 reports the gender di erences in the risk preferences in the Dospert task.
Across contexts we see that males tend to be more likely to engage in risky behavior
and perceive given risks to be less risky. This gender di erence is especially pro-
nounced in the investment and gamble contexts where males are respectively 23%
and 14% less risk averse. There is no gender di erence in the social and ethical
domains. Males tend to expect a higher probability for the high outcome to occur
than females. Males dislike the bad outcome less than females do, but they enjoy the
high outcome the same. This pattern applies to all contexts except for the ethical
and social contexts where there is no significant gender di erence in risk taking or
perceived riskiness. These results are in line with the findings of Harris et al. (2006).
We next study the drivers of these gender di erence in risk preferences in the
Dospert task. In Columns 1 and 4 of Tab. 2.5 we control for the context specific
e ects. In columns 2 and 5 we additionally control for the perceived outcomes
and the estimated probability of the good outcome to occur. We find that these are
significantly related to risk preference for both genders. Columns 3 and 6 include the
interactions of the probability and the expected utility associated with the outcome.
We find significant interaction e ects, consistent with an Expected Utility type
model. In column 7 we estimate the model for both genders simultaneously, and
obtain an absolute gender gap of 0.20. Once we control for the perceived outcome
and probabilities in column 8 this gender gap is no longer significant. This implies
that on the aggregate the perceived outcome and probabilities can fully explain the
overall gender di erence in risk preference. Context specific gender di erences in
17
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the e ects of outcomes and probabilities are ruled out in context specific regressions
(not reported). In column 9 we allow for gender specific e ects of the probabilities or
outcomes, and find none. This is in line with our earlier results for the lottery based
risk attitude elicitation task that pointed at a lack of gender di erences in probability
weighting. In column 9 we additionally allow for residual context-dependent gender
e ects. We find that in the investment context males take more risk, thus even after
controlling for a perceived outcomes and probabilities. These findings are suggestive
of ’other’ forces at work in this context (Driver 5 ). There may be gender di erences
in the familiarity e ect when females are less familiar with the investment context,
causing them to be less willing to invest irrespective of the perceived utility.
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Table 2.5.: Risk Taking in Dospert Task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Female Female Female Male Male Male Both Both Both
Social context 1.13*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.74*** 0.09 0.10 0.94*** 0.19** 0.31***
(0.076) (0.086) (0.085) (0.093) (0.105) (0.106) (0.062) (0.069) (0.086)
Recreation context 0.04 -0.38*** -0.40*** 0.09 -0.33*** -0.34*** 0.06 -0.36*** -0.38***
(0.101) (0.087) (0.085) (0.104) (0.087) (0.088) (0.072) (0.062) (0.087)
Gamble context -0.96*** -1.24*** -1.16*** -0.77*** -1.09*** -0.98*** -0.87*** -1.17*** -1.24***
(0.097) (0.107) (0.109) (0.126) (0.130) (0.126) (0.079) (0.083) (0.107)
Ethics context -0.50*** -0.77*** -0.75*** -0.83*** -1.03*** -1.01*** -0.66*** -0.91*** -0.77***
(0.066) (0.063) (0.061) (0.079) (0.077) (0.076) (0.052) (0.051) (0.063)
Investment context 0.40*** -0.49*** -0.48*** 0.63*** -0.20 -0.16 0.51*** -0.36*** -0.49***
(0.114) (0.103) (0.101) (0.136) (0.140) (0.141) (0.088) (0.088) (0.103)
Value of high outcome 0.20*** 0.08** 0.22*** 0.05 0.21*** 0.20***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.029) (0.040) (0.018) (0.023)
Value of low outcome -0.16*** -0.06 -0.20*** -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.16***
(0.028) (0.044) (0.034) (0.046) (0.022) (0.028)
Prob of high outcome 1.73*** 0.31 1.51*** 0.38 1.62*** 1.73***
(0.137) (0.473) (0.124) (0.357) (0.094) (0.137)
Prob of high outcome 0.27*** 0.35***
*value of high outcome (0.054) (0.085)
Prob of high outcome -0.18** -0.06
*value of low outcome (0.091) (0.066)
Male 0.20** 0.06 0.32
(0.071) (0.060) (0.240)
Prob of high outcome -0.22
*male (0.185)
Value high outcome* 0.02
male (0.037)
Value Low outcome* -0.04
Male (0.044)
Social x male -0.22*
(0.135)
Recreation x male 0.05
(0.123)
Gamble x male 0.16
(0.168)
Ethics x male -0.26**
(0.099)
Invest x male 0.29*
(0.174)
Constant 2.38*** 2.12*** 2.70*** 2.66*** 2.43*** 2.91*** 2.42*** 2.26*** 2.12***
(0.070) (0.167) (0.329) (0.087) (0.174) (0.245) (0.062) (0.127) (0.166)
N 3280 3280 3280 3120 3120 3120 6400 6400 6400
Linear regressions. Dependent Variable: Likelihood to take risk. Robust (clustered) standard errors in brackets (Nr of subjects =1600). ***<0.001; **<0.05 *<0.01.
The control is the health context.
2.4.3. Results: relating the risk attitude elicitation tasks
Next I contrast the risk preference elicitation tasks to see how the results compare.
Beside the Dospert task and the Lottery List Elicitation Task I include additional
risk elicitation methods: I include a large stake hypothetical inheritance task, and
subjects self-reported risk aversion and loss aversion. Like Anderson and Mellor
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(2009) I categorized the responses in the inheritance task in 8 categories, category
8 being most risk averse5. For the self-reports I use a 6 point scale, with 6 being
extremely risk/loss averse. For both tasks we find females to be significantly more
risk averse and they report to be more loss averse, details are in the Appendix.
Tab. 2.6 displays the correlation across elicitation tasks by gender. The risk at-
titudes in the Dospert questions tend to be significantly correlated across contexts
for both genders. The correlation between the health and recreation contexts and
the correlation between investment and gambling contexts being the highest. There
are some notable gender di erences in the relations across contexts. For males risk
taking in the gambling context is not correlated to risk taking in the social context.
Suggesting that for males these reflect distinct traits. Correlation between risk tak-
ing in the health and recreation context and the correlation between risk taking in
the ethical and recreation contexts is much higher for males than for females. For
females correlation with risk taking in the investment context is higher than that for
males for all contexts, suggesting that for males risk taking in investment scenarios
is not so much related to general risk preferences.
The relation between lottery domains are similar across genders. Risk preferences
in the positive and mixed domains of the Lottery List Task are strongly positively
correlated, whereas risk preferences in the positive and mixed domains are negatively
correlated with risk preferences in the negative domain. A potential explanation is
that if the willingness to accept risk in the negative domain is largely driven by
diminishing disutility of losses which may be correlated with diminishing returns of
gains.
5A small percentage of the subjects provided inconsistent answers and could therefore not be
categorized. In the original data there were no males that replied “don’t know” to at least one
of the questions, but there were several females that did. The exclusion of these observations
may therefore bias our results. I therefore recategorized the data and included those subjects
who were inconsistent or who answered ’dont know’ to at least one question in the lowest
category that included the most risky gamble that they accepted.
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Relating the di erent risk attitude elicitation methods yields some interesting in-
sights in the nature of gender di erences in risk preferences. Overall, risk preferences
in monetary based risk attitude elicitation tasks (Dospert investment, LLT task, and
the Inheritance task) are strongly correlated for males but not females. For females
the risk taking in the positive domain lottery questions in the LLT is strongly cor-
related with risk taking in recreation contexts, for males it is strongly correlated
with risk taking in the investment contexts. Risk taking in the negative domain
of the LLT is negatively correlated to risk taking in investment contexts for males.
This may be because of a positive correlation of diminishing disutility of losses and
diminishing utility of gains. Risk taking in the LLT task in lotteries involving mixed
outcomes is positively correlated with risk taking in investment contexts for males.
Surprisingly risk taking in mixed lotteries of the LLT task negatively correlated with
risk taking in investment contexts for females. It is possible that for females the
losses in the mixed lotteries play a di erent role for preferences than they do for
males, but this is pure speculation. The inheritance task is significantly correlated
with the decisions in Dospert task involving the investment context for males but
not females. This task is also significantly correlated with the Lottery List Task for
males, again with a negative correlation with the negative domain of this task, sug-
gesting that men who are more risk averse in lotteries involving positive outcomes
tend to be more risk seeking in the negative domain. For females these tasks are
not related, except for the negative domain of the lottery list task; more risk taking
in this domain implies more risk taking in the inheritance task.
The last two rows show that self reported risk aversion is significantly correlated
with risk taking in the recreation context for both genders, and that for males it is
also correlated with the gambling context. Unexpectedly for females it is negatively
correlated with risk taking in the investment context. Self reported loss aversion
22
for males is positively correlated with risk aversion in the recreation context. For
females self-reported loss aversion is positively and significantly correlated with risk
aversion in the positive and in the mixed domain. If higher risk aversion and loss
aversion go hand in hand for women this may explain the negative correlation of
both the self reported risk aversion and the risk aversion in the mixed lotteries of
the LLT task with risk taking in the investment context.In the Appendix I include
regressions of risk taking in the Dospert task that control for the risk attitudes
derived in the lottery list elicitation task and the inheritance task. In general they
cannot significantly explain the risk attitudes in the Dospert task. The investment
and the gambling contexts resemble the scenarios of the lottery elicitation tasks
more closely, and for these contexts the elicited risk preferences do have predictive
value, they do not however succeed in reducing the gender gap in risk preferences.
These results indicate that females and males respond quite di erently to di erent
risks. For men the investment context stands out, as they are much more willing to
take risk in this context and their risk attitude in this context is less correlated with
risk taking in other contexts. For males higher risk taking in the LLT task and the
inheritance task is predictive of higher risk taking in the investment context, whereas
for females this is not the case. It appears that the involvement of monetary rewards
has a distinct e ect on males and not females.
2.4.4. Results: relating personal characteristics to gender
di erences in risk preferences
We consider several variables that have been proposed as drivers for the gender
di erence in risk preference. In the Appendix we compare the means across genders
for these characteristics. We find that females score significantly higher on the
23
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anxiety task, score lower on the cognitive reflection test (consistent with Frederick,
2005) as well as the risk numeracy test. Significantly fewer females expect high
future income. Consistent with the findings of (Jacobsen et al., 2014) and (Barber
and Odean, 2001) they also report to be less optimistic, consider themselves to be
less lucky and report lower confidence.
Tab. 2.7 examines the e ect of these individual characteristics on the gender gap
in risk aversion in the lottery list risk attitude elicitation task. Column 1 displays
the risk preferences in the positive domain. Cognitive reflection and risk numeracy
both significantly reduce risk aversion, whereas optimism increases it, the other
individual characteristics have no significant e ect on risk taking in the positive
domain. Notably, inclusion of the individual characteristics does not reduce the
absolute gender di erence in the coe cient of risk aversion, the di erence remains
0.22. Column 2 depicts the risk preference in the negative domain with b referring
to the amount of risk taking. Risk numeracy and optimism now have no significant
e ect but anxiety (GAD) and cognitive reflection both significantly reduces risk
taking in the negative domain, (the latter is consistent with the finding of Frederick,
2005). Those with higher expected future income are significantly more willing to
take risk in the negative domain. Allowing for individual characteristics again does
not reduce the absolute gender di erence in risk preferences, it remains close to 0.23.
Controlling for the individual characteristics this gender di erence is now significant
(‰2(1) = 6.82, p < 0.01.)
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Table 2.7.: Risk Preferences in Lottery List Task, RDEU Specification
Positive domain Negative domain
a/b
Male -0.2190* 0.278***
(0.123) (0.106)
GAD -0.002 0.011**
(0.006) (0.005)
CRT -0.074*** -0.111***
(0.022) (0.022)
Risk Numeracy -0.048* -0.026
(0.027) (0.022)
High expected Income -0.060 0.117**
(0.049) (0.057)
Optimist 0.211*** -0.011
(0.058) (0.089)
Lucky -0.013 -0.067
(0.047) (0.064)
Confidence -0.016 -0.007
(0.014) (0.012)
Constant 0.676*** 0.366***
(0.138) (0.099)
w
Male -0.051 -0.144
(0.335) (0.264)
Constant 1.439*** 1.815***
(0.296) (0.146)
Genderxtreatment e ects yes yes
Maximum likelihood estimates of baseline DARA preference with a CRRA value function
with coe cient of relative risk aversion aon the positive domain and risk lovingness bon the
negative domain. w refers to the weighting of the probability of the low outcome (p=0.25)
on the positive domain and the low outcome (p=0.75) on the positive domain. Clustered
standard errors in brackets. ***<0.001; **<0.05; *<0.01
We next see whether individual characteristics can explain part of the gender gap
in risk preferences in the Dospert task. Results are in Tab. 2.8. In column 1 we
control for gender, context, and the interactions between gender and the context of
the Dospert question. The initial gap in risk preferences is estimated as 0.29 and
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we estimate additional gender specific e ects for several contexts. In column 2 the
inclusion of the the individual characteristics does not help explain the overall gender
gap in risk preferences or the gender specific context e ects. None of the individual
characteristics significantly predicts risk taking in the Dospert task. In column
3 the inclusion of expected outcomes and probabilities does eliminate the gender
gap, except for the ethics context (males take less risk) and the gambling context
(males take more risks). In the Appendix we control for individual characteristics
in the large stake hypothetical inheritance task. None of the individual attributes
has a significant e ect on risk aversion in this task, and also for this risk attitude
elicitation task the gender gap in risk preferences is not a ected by the inclusion of
these variables.
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Table 2.8.: E ect of Individual Characteristics in Dospert Task
(1) (2) (3)
Male 0.29** 0.25** 0.08
(0.111) (0.111) (0.102)
Social context 1.13*** 1.13*** 0.29***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.081)
Recreation context 0.04 0.04 -0.38***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.086)
Gambling context -0.96*** -0.96*** -1.27***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.101)
Ethical context -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.79***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.062)
Investment context 0.40*** 0.40*** -0.50***
(0.113) (0.114) (0.104)
Social context -0.38** -0.38** -0.17
x male (0.120) (0.120) (0.109)
Recreation context 0.05 0.05 0.05
x male (0.145) (0.145) (0.121)
Gambling context 0.20 0.20 0.22
x male (0.159) (0.159) (0.144)
Ethics context -0.33** -0.33** -0.23**
x male (0.102) (0.102) (0.094)
Investment context 0.23 0.23 0.32**
x male (0.177) (0.177) (0.157)
GAD -0.01 -0.01
(0.007) (0.006)
CRT 0.00 -0.02
(0.045) (0.037)
Risk Numeracy 0.04 -0.00
(0.052) (0.040)
High expected income -0.08 -0.06
(0.100) (0.087)
Optimist -0.02 0.04
(0.104) (0.083)
Lucky 0.06 -0.01
(0.081) (0.070)
Confidence 0.02 0.01
(0.023) (0.019)
Value of high outcome 0.21***
(0.018)
Value of low outcome -0.18***
(0.023)
Prob of high outcome 1.63***
(0.092)
Constant 2.38*** 2.27*** 2.27***
(0.069) (0.179) (0.180)
N 6400 6400 6400
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. ***<0.001; **<0.05;
*<0.01
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2.5. Discussion and Conclusion
Females are more risk averse than males. In this paper we replicated this gender
di erence in risk preference using a large range of risk attitude elicitation methods,
and a large number of contexts. The results indicate that in a world of known
outcomes and probabilities this gender di erence is driven by risk aversion over out-
comes and not by di erences in probability weighting or di erences in loss aversion,
and is thus not clearly the result of increased behavioral bias. In environments where
outcomes and probabilities are not common knowledge, females’ relative pessimism
increases the gender gap in risk preferences. Future research will need to establish
whether females are overly pessimistic and whether there is a potential for policy
interventions to address these biased expectations. We controlled for a wide variety
of individual characteristics that have been argued to be behind the gender gap in
risk preferences but were not able to significantly reduce the gender di erence.
The results indicate that the gender gap is especially pronounced in risky deci-
sions involving monetary contexts. In addition, the monetary context stands out as
the gap in gender di erences in risk aversion for risks in this type of context cannot
be explained by the expected value associated with the risk. It appears that other
factors are driving risk preferences in this context. This is surprising as we intu-
itively expect monetary risk taking to most closely resemble the rational decision
framework. It is left for future research to find out what factors are responsible. For
example, if males are more familiar with the financial context, this may -due to the
familiarity bias- cause increased appetite for investing, regardless of the perceived
outcomes and probabilities. Similarly, males may feel more proficient in the financial
domain than females. Perceived proficiency is known to be correlated with higher
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risk taking.
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3. Risk in the Background: How
Men and Women Respond
3.1. Introduction
When considering risks in isolation, lab and field studies find that females have
higher baseline risk aversion; they are generally less inclined to accept a risky
prospect than males (e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Eckel and Grossman, 2008).
However, decisions to take on risk typically do not occur in isolation; rather they
occur in the presence of a risky environment. Decision makers will have had previous
exposure to risks of which they have since learned the outcome, and may simultane-
ously face risks of which the outcome is not yet revealed. For example, an investment
banker, deciding whether to purchase $300 million of stocks may moments before
have made the deal of his lifetime. An engineer considering to undergo a risky
surgery may at the same time be burdened by whispers of a looming reorganization
at her company. Even when the fortunate realization of the investment banker’s
previous investment does not objectively alter the odds of the stock investment, this
’realized risk’ may still impact his willingness to buy. Similarly, even though the
potential layo  does not a ect her medical outlook, the presence of this ’unrealized
risk’ may still influence the engineer’s likelihood to opt for surgery. In order to have
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a true grasp of the gender di erences in risk attitudes, we will therefore need to
allow for these interactions with the decision environment.
In this paper I use laboratory experiments to test whether there are gender dif-
ferences in how the presence of - independent, exogenous and uninsurable- risk, also
termed ’background risk,’ and its realizations a ect subsequent risk attitudes. The
design also allows me to establish whether this sensitivity is driven by the associated
(potential) income. Decision models such as Expected Utility Theory or Prospect
Theory allow for an e ect of realized and unrealized background risk on subsequent
risk attitudes through the income associated with their (potential) outcomes. How-
ever, realized and unrealized risk may also impact risk attitudes through non-income
channels. The experience of winning after the realization of risk may for example
give rise to altered emotional or hormonal states, or a ect expectations on the odds
of subsequent risky prospects. Similarly, the experience of the stochastic element
associated with an unrealized risk may create a state of suspense that directly a ects
risk attitudes.
I find that an increase in income increases risk taking in females, but does not
increase risk taking in males. Positive-outcome unrealized risk also tends to increase
risk taking in females but not in males, and this e ect appears to be mostly driven
by the income associated with the potential outcomes of the lottery. The size of the
increase in risk taking is significant, and eliminates the initial gender di erence in
risk attitude. The income e ect appears transient, and females eventually return
to baseline risk preferences. The experience of winning after the realization of risk
increases risk taking in males but does not have this e ect for females.
The sensitivity to the potential income associated with the unrealized risk for
females is consistent with the commonly used isoelastic utility function. For this
function increased sensitivity to income is implied by higher baseline risk aversion.
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Because females have higher baseline risk aversion, the isoelastic utility function
implies that a background risk with strictly positive potential outcomes will reduce
their risk aversion more. The temporary nature of the e ect of income is consistent
with decision models that feature reference point dependence, including Prospect
Theory. The observed winning e ect for males is consistent with the observations
by Wall Street trader turned neuroscientist John Coates, who reports how past
profitable trades appeared to increase risk taking in male Wall Street traders to
an irrational and dangerously high magnitude, an e ect he attributes to winning-
induced surges in testosterone Coates (2012).
The findings of this study support a more integrated view on risk attitude. This
paper joins the ranks of other studies that stress the importance of the riskiness of
the decision environment: Cameron and Shah (2013) find that the experience of an
earthquake or flood reduces risk taking in lottery-based elicitation tasks by about
50%. Nagel and Malmendier (2011) find that the generation who experienced the
Great Depression has a lower willingness to take financial risk. Provincial level GDP
growth variability and variable business income have also been found to reduce risk
taking (Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Heaton and Lucas, 2000). All these studies suggest
the need to further explore the context in which risky decisions are made.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the ways through which
realized and unrealized risk can a ect risk attitudes. In the conceptual framework
of Section III, I derive the testable conditions that enable me to estimate gender-
specific e ects. Section IV describes the experimental design, Section V reports the
experimental results and Section VI concludes.
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3.2. Theory and Evidence
3.2.1. Sensitivity to realized risk: the income or the experience?
The realization of a risk can a ect the risk attitude towards subsequent, unre-
lated, risks because of the income associated with the realization of the risk, and
also through the associated experience. Income e ects feature heavily in decision
models such as (Cumulative) Prospect Theory (CPT) and Expected Utility Theory
(EUT.) In true EUT, the assumptions of total wealth integration and decreasing
absolute risk aversion imply increased risk taking after increased income. However,
experimentalists have increasingly moved away from this model to explain risk tak-
ing in laboratory studies. Rabin and Thaler (2001) observe that the assumption of
total wealth integration dictates that subjects should be risk neutral over the small
stakes that are typically used in lab experiments, and this assumption is therefore
irreconcilable with the facts. Many studies have since rejected the assumption of
(full) wealth integration (Heinemann, 2008; Bardsley et al., 2006). The evidence of
lack of wealth integration is consistent with the concept of ’narrow framing’ where
people make investment decisions without taking into account their total portfolio.
A version of EUT, in which subjects partake in narrow framing and integrate only
the earnings that fall within the frame (e.g., their earlier experimental earnings),
does allow for income e ects on the restricted domain that the laboratory experi-
ment provides.1 In the remainder of this paper whenever I discuss the income e ects
of ’EUT’, I refer to this narrow framing version of EUT. Although the CPT model
does not feature asset integration, because of the slope of the value function, in-
1The assumption of integration of experimental income is susceptible to similar criticism as the
assumption of asset integration in EUT. Any theory of decision making under risk that relies
on diminishing marginal utility of wealth to explain risk attitude, regardless if they specify full,
partial or no asset integration, is susceptible to a version of the Rabin critique (Cox et al., 2007;
Cox and Sadiraj, 2008).
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come associated with the realization of risk may still temporarily a ect risk taking
if people fail to update their reference points.
These decision models do not allow for a direct e ect from the experience of the
realization of risk. When the outcome of the realized risk is fortunate and the
decision maker ’wins,’ the experience of winning may directly impact risk prefer-
ences. For example, winning may create certain emotions that in turn a ect risk
preferences. Good mood has been shown to increase optimism, and stock markets
do better on sunny days (e.g., Wright and Bower, 1992; Hirshleifer and Shumway,
2003). Hormones are also a ected by winning: Winning increases testosterone in
men and increases their risk taking (Apicella et al., 2014). Winning may also a ect
beliefs. For example, it may give rise to hot-hand beliefs: After a string of suc-
cesses, individuals have been shown to believe they are on a winning streak and give
subjective probabilities of winning that exceed the objective probabilities (Sundali
et al., 2012). In contrast, winning may give rise to the gambler’s fallacy and reduce
the perceived likelihood of winning a subsequent, independent, risk.
Although I am not aware of incentivized and controlled experiments that feature
both genders, there is some research that suggests increased risk taking after past
wins. Traders at the Taiwan Stock Exchange take above average risks after gains
in prior trading outcomes (Wang et al., 2010). In a study by Thaler and Johnson
(1990), participants were presented with a list of hypothetical statements in the
form “you have won/lost X.” Following a hypothetical win, participants were more
likely to take a gamble. In their study with male subjects, Apicella et al. (2014) find
that risk taking increases after winning the rock-paper-scissors game.
3.2.2. Sensitivity to unrealized risk: the income, or the
anticipation?
An independent and uninsurable ’background risk’ can a ect the willingness to
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take on subsequent risk in two ways. Firstly, in income based decision models the
potential income associated with the possible outcomes of background risks may af-
fect risk taking. Within the EUT model, the assumption of asset integration ensures
that the potential income associated with the possible outcomes of the background
risk a ects subsequent risk taking (Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Quiggin, 2003). For un-
desirable background risks, utility functions that satisfy proper risk aversion (Pratt
and Zeckhauser, 1987), standard risk aversion (Kimball, 1993) and the more general
risk vulnerability (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) all imply increased (absolute) risk aver-
sion, and these conditions are met by a quite plausible set of assumptions. When it
comes to desirable risks, the e ect on risk attitude is less straightforward as there are
two opposite forces. The increased riskiness may increase risk aversion for future risk
in risk-vulnerable subjects, but the increased utility may reduce it (Gollier, 2001).
Reference-point-dependent models such as CPT can also allow for an e ect on risk
attitude. If an individual’s reference points are not updated after the introduction
of background risk, the potential income associated with the background risk can
a ect risk taking through the e ect of the induced gain- or loss-domain.
In a behavioral model, a second potential source of reactivity to unrealized risk
is the sensitivity to the “risk component” of the background risk. The state of
anticipation implies a presence of suspense that may change reference points or
induce cognitive load and emotions; all of these have been shown to a ect risk
attitudes Loewenstein et al. (2001); Deck and Jahedi (2013). The model of Koszegi
and Rabin (2006) allows for stochastic reference point distributions. It represents the
notion that the risk component of unrealized risk a ects tolerance to subsequent risks
through the adjustment of the referent of what constitutes ‘normal’ risk. Sprenger
(2010) shows that this model can result in an endowment e ect for risks where the
exposure to background risks makes a person more tolerant towards subsequent risks
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There have been few studies that feature true experimental tests of the e ect of
background risk on risk taking, and none have studied gender di erences. Results
of the studies are conflicting. The low-stake lab-based experiments of Lusk and
Coble (2008), and the low-stake field experiment with collector coins by List et al.
(2007), suggest a small reduction in risk taking in the presence of negative-outcome
background risk and mean-reserving spreads. On the other hand, research on narrow
bracketing finds that when selecting multiple risks, subjects appear to make decisions
as if the risks are isolated (e.g., Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Rabin and Weizsäcker,
2009). Samuelson (1963) finds that o ering multiple risks increases risk taking, a
phenomenon he termed the “fallacy of large numbers.” Sprenger (2010) also reports
an increase in risk tolerance after endowing people with risks.
3.3. Conceptual Framework
3.3.1. Determining income e ects for men and women
To determine the income e ects for men and women, we will first derive the
income e ect associated with obtaining a risk-free sum. Next we will derive the
income associated with obtaining a risky sum.
3.3.1.1. Income e ects associated with a risk-free sum
We define the absolute risk aversion at initial referent point w as baseline risk
aversion, depending on the relevant referent w can refer to wealth or initial income
or something else, but for simplicity we will refer to w as initial income. Decreasing
absolute risk aversion (AR) implies a negative income e ect after an increase in
income by x because it causes a reduction from baseline risk aversion, i.e., AR(w)
< AR(x,w).
Definition. The income e ect of change in income x on absolute risk aversion
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at w is defined as IC(x, w) = AR(x, w)≠ AR(w).
Letting income changes b and c denote 2 potential realizations of a lottery, with
b>c>0. Letting p the probability associated with the occurrence of b we can rep-
resent the risk by the lottery Lú(X) = (p; b, c). Decreasing absolute risk aversion
implies a larger reduction in risk aversion if outcome b is realized than if outcome c is
realized. Therefore, the income e ect of b is more negative, i.e., IC(b, w) < IC(c, w).
In EUT with narrow framing b and c refer to the earlier-obtained income within
the narrow frame. In models with reference-point dependence, b and c refer to the
distance as compared to the reference point w. This inequality may not hold if
people more crudely respond to the gain (or loss) frame that the income induces,
because in that case there may not be level e ects of income on risk attitude.
The realization of risk may come with a larger income e ect for females because
they have higher baseline risk aversion (i.e., ARf (w) > ARm(w). To see this, note
that if at any wealth level w agent i is more risk averse than decision maker j, it
holds that ui(w) = g ¶ uj(w) for some concave function g. It can be derived that
ARi(w) = ARj(w) ≠ f(w) where f(w) = gÕÕ(uj(w)))gÕ(uj(w)) uÕj(w) and f(w) < 0. Therefore,
the income e ects for agent i after the realization of the lottery can be written as:
ICi(x, w) = (ARj(x, w)≠f(w+x))≠(ARj(w)≠f(w)) = ICj(x, w)≠(f(w+x)≠f(w).)
For f increasing in w, the income e ect after the assignment of a positive-outcome
realized risk would reduce risk aversion more for agent i than it would for agent j.
This condition can easily be verified for the commonly used power utility function
u(w) = w1≠ﬂ1≠ﬂ . For this function, RR = ﬂ is the coe cient of relative risk aversion.
Absolute risk aversion is decreasing, with AR = ﬂw . If females have higher relative
risk aversion than males (i.e., RRf = ﬂf = ﬂm + c), they thus have higher baseline
absolute risk aversion ARf = ﬂm+cw . Since ARf = ARm ≠ f(w) it must hold that
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f(w) = ≠ cw with f Õ > 0. Therefore, in this family of functions, income will increase
risk taking more for agents with higher baseline risk aversion.2
3.3.1.2. Income e ects associated with a risky sum
Similar to the e ect of a certain change in income, the possible income associated
with the potential outcomes of unrealized risk also can a ect risk aversion. Allowing
for a stochastic element in wealth in the form of random variable k˜, and making
use of the indirect utility function (Kihlstrom et al., 1981), it holds for all w that
v(w) = Eu(w + k˜). Since v[n](w) = Eu[n](w + k˜) (Gollier, 2001), it holds that:
AR(w, k˜) = ≠v
ÕÕ(w)
vÕ(w) = ≠
EuÕÕ(w + k˜)
EuÕ(w + k˜)
Next let x˜ denote the random variable associated with the unrealized risk represented
by lottery Lú(X) = (p; b, c). Since Ev(w + x˜) = p(v(w + b)) + (1 ≠ p)v(w + c), it
follows that:
AR(w, k˜, x˜) = ≠Ev
ÕÕ(w + x˜)
EvÕ(w + x˜) = ≠
pvÕÕ(w + b) + (1≠ p)vÕÕ(w + c)
pvÕ(w + b) + (1≠ p)vÕ(w + c)
This implies:
AR(w, k˜, x˜) = sAR(w, k˜, b) + (1≠ s)AR(w, k˜, c) (3.1)
2If the observed gender di erence in risk attitude is driven by lower initial wealth levels/lower
reference points for females (wf < wm, )5but they have otherwise identical DARA preferences,
this could also explain the higher risk aversion of females. An increase in income by x then
comes with a larger reduction in risk aversion for females as long as IC Õ > 0, which is satisfied
for the power utility function, as for this function IC Õ = ﬂw2 ≠ ﬂ(w+x)2 > 0.
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with s = 1
1+ 1≠pp
vÕ(c+w)
vÕ(b+w)
. Note that s>0.5 for c>b. This can also be shown to hold for
non-stochastic reference-point models such as CPT.3
The e ect of the potential incomes of the background risk can thus be written as:
IC(w, k˜, x˜) = sIC(b.w) + (1≠ s)IC(c, w.)
For b>c>0 and with DARA preferences risk aversion would therefore also reduce in
the presence of background risk.
The theoretical implications of the power utility function for gender di erences
in income e ects are similar for unrealized risk as they were for realized risk.
For stochastic income in the form of lottery Lú(X), it holds that ICf (x˜, w) =
s(ICm(b, w) ≠ f(w + b)) + (1 ≠ s)(ICm(c, w) ≠ f(w + c) and thus for f increasing
in wealth, the income e ect after the assignment of a positive-outcome unrealized
risk would reduce risk aversion more for a female with higher baseline risk aversion
than it would for a male with lower baseline risk aversion.
Assuming an income based decision model with narrow framing and a power
utility function results in the following empirically testable predictions:
(1) An increase in income reduces aversion, i.e., IC < 0.
(2) A background risk with strictly positive potential outcomes reduces aversion
for subsequent risks, i.e., IC < 0.
(3) A background risk or realized risk with strictly positive outcomes will reduce
female risk aversion for subsequent risks more, i.e., ICf < ICm.
3Within non-stochastic reference-point-based decision models such as CPT, there would be an
e ect of the potential incomes associated with unrealized risk on subsequent risk preferences if
people fail to update their reference point. For a background risk with strictly positive outcomes
that is not included in the reference point, condition (1) would still hold, although behavioral
probability weighting would a ect the weighting(s). Intuitively, because the outcomes of the
risk are strictly positive, and risk preferences are still derived from the slope of the (concave)
value function, the same results hold as before. Specifically, for a behavioral value function
(denoted u*(x)), the indirect value function in the presence of unrealized risk can be set as
v(.) = Euú(x˜) = w(p)uú(b) + (1≠ w(p))uú(c).
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3.3.2. Determining winning e ects for men and women
Realized risks can a ect risk attitude through non-income channels when people
are a ected by the experience of ’winning’ or ’losing.’ In order to define the winning
e ect associated with the realization of risk, we denote L the set of simple lotteries
on the finite outcome set X. A lottery L in L is a function L : X æ — that has
L(x) Ø 0’x œ X and qxœX L(x) = 1. For any x œ X, let ”x denote the degenerate
lottery that has L(x) = 1. Next, refer to Lx ∏ (L\”x) as the set of non-degenerate
lotteries that have positive support on x. Then denote the set of outcome-generating
processes for outcome x as Qx = {Lx, ”x}. When assuming that risk attitudes are
not sensitive to the way in which the income comes about (i.e., no consequentialism),
it holds that AR(w, x, qx) = AR(w, x), and thus AR(w, x|”x) = AR(w, x|Lx). If in
contrast, people are sensitive to the experience that comes with the realization of
risk, this condition will not hold. Letting x* be the highest possible outcome of
lottery Lxú œ Lxú, the winning of lottery Lxú implies the outcome x=x*.
Definition. For the lottery Lx the winning e ect of winning x on absolute
risk aversion, at wealth level w, is defined as WN(w, x, Lx) = AR(w, x|Lx) ≠
AR(w, x|”x).4
The absolute risk aversion after winning x* in lottery Lxú can then be written as
AR(w, x ú |Lxú) = AR(w) + IC(w, xú) +WN(w, xú, Lxú). The assumption of non-
consequentialism does not suggest a role for the experience of winning, resulting in
the following testable condition:
4A reference point dependent model can imply a winning e ect if the reference point of the
subjects in the high fixed sum treatment has been updated (e.g. AR(w, x|”x) = AR(w)). but
the outcome of the background risk in the background risk treatment is not yet incorporated
in the reference point. Letting w’ denote the reference point in the presence of background risk
we would have AR(w, x|Lx) = AR(wÕ)+ IC(wú, (x+w≠wÕ)) = AR(w)+ IC(w, (x+w≠wÕ))
and there will be relatively less risk aversion for the subjects in the background risk treatment
that win the high outcome. Conditional on an income e ect the surprise of winning will reduce
risk aversion as it brings people in the gain domain.
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(4) Both males and females are not sensitive to the e ect of winning after a
fortunate realization of a risk, i.e., AR(w, x ú |Lxú) = AR(w) + IC(w, xú).
3.3.3. Determining anticipation e ects for men and women
If the presence of unrealized risk a ects risk attitudes through channels other than
income, 3.1 will not hold.
Definition. For random variable x˜ associated with lottery Lx, the anticipa-
tion e ect on absolute risk aversion at wealth level w is defined as ANT (w, x) =
AR(w, x˜)≠ s(AR(w, b)) + (1≠ s)(AR(w, c)) .
The anticipation e ect can also be written asANT (w, x˜) = AR(w, x˜)≠s(IC(w, b)+
AR(w)) + (1 ≠ s)((IC(w, c) + AR(w). If there are no income e ects, this reduces
to ANT (w, x˜) = AR(w, x˜) ≠ AR(w). As the conventional decision theories do not
allow for an e ect of anticipation, they make the following prediction:
(5) Females and males are not sensitive to an e ect of anticipation, i.e., AR(w, x˜) =
s(AR(w, b)) + (1≠ s)((AR(w, c)).
3.4. Experimental Design
The experiments were run at the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory in the
summer of 2013 with a total of 160 subjects. All subjects were students, 50% were
male, about 2/3 were American, average age was 21-22 years, and a bit more than
half were Caucasian. All subjects were identified by code numbers and remained
anonymous. The experiments were programmed and conducted with the software
Z-Tree Fischbacher (2007).
The experiment consists of four parts. The first part involves a filler task: All
subjects started the experiment by completing a 45-minute questionnaire for which
they received $15. This task was designed to prevent a house-money e ect associated
with the earning of $15. The second part of the experiment was designed to measure
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the e ect of unrealized risk. Each subjects was either in a background-risk treatment,
a fixed-sum treatment or a control treatment (see Tab. 3.1). The 75 subjects in the
Background Risk treatment were provides with a dice and were informed that an
experimenter would come to roll this dice later in the experiment and that they
would earn $30 when the dice turned up 1, 2, or 3, and $2 otherwise. Subjects in
the High-Fixed Sum treatment were notified that they received $30, and subjects in
the Low-Fixed Sum treatment were notified that they received $2. Subjects in the
Control treatment received nothing. Thereafter, subjects participated in a lottery-
based risk attitude elicitation task (Lottery List Task). During this task, subjects in
the background-risk treatment were reminded of the assigned risk through a heading
bar at the top of their computer screens, and subjects in the high- and low-fixed-sum
treatments were reminded of their assigned fixed sums. The elicitation method is
similar to Abdellaoui et al. (2011) with the exception that I also include mixed-
outcome and negative-outcome lotteries. Subjects could earn a maximum of $15
and lose a maximum of $15. The task comprises 15 lists of 7 decisions, each list
being associated with one particular lottery. In each of the 7 decisions, the lottery
is contrasted with a di erent fixed sum. The lowest fixed sum equals the lowest
possible lottery outcome, and the highest fixed sum equals the highest possible
outcome. After subjects make their decisions, one of the 15x7 decisions is randomly
selected for payment. (See Fig. 3.1 for a screenshot of one of the lottery lists in the
lottery list task.) This method is found to be more tractable and less sensitive to
the bias that is associated with procedures that rely on comparing non-degenerate
lotteries, (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre, 2012).
Table 3.1.: Treatments for the E ect of Unrealized Risk
High Sum (N) Low Sum (N) Control (N)
Unrealized Risk Background Risk (75) Background Risk (75)
Assigned Sum High Fixed Sum (29) Low Fixed Sum (25) Control (23)
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Table 3.2.: Treatments for the E ect of Realized Risk
High Sum (N) Low Sum (N) Control (N)
Realized Risk High Realized Risk (36) Low Realized Risk (39)
Assigned Sum High-Fixed Sum (29) Low-Fixed Sum (25) Control (23)
Part three of the experiment measured subjects’ sensitivity to realized risk. Sub-
jects in all treatments were informed about the selected decision in the Lottery
List Task, the outcome of the associated lottery, and their payo s. Then, in the
Background-Risk treatments, an experimenter came by to roll the dice for each
subject. Depending on the outcome of the dice roll, subjects received either the
low outcome (Low-Realized Risk) or the high outcome (High-Realized Risk). (See
Tab. 3.2.) Next, all subjects answered a standard incentivized risk elicitation task on
the positive domain, similar to Holt and Laury (2002) but with quadrupled payo s.
This task is displayed in Fig. 3.2.5 One of the 10 decisions was randomly selected
for payment. In part 4, subjects filled out a short demographic questionnaire (most
importantly for us indicating their gender) and received their payo s. The total
experiment took about 1.5 hours.
5I excluded 8 subjects from the analysis of the second part of the experiment because they had
received incorrect information.
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Figure 3.1.: Lottery List Decision Task
3.5. Results
3.5.1. The e ect of unrealized risk
The decisions in the lottery list task in the first part of the experiment enable
us to estimate the e ect of unrealized risk. I apply the approach outlined in the
conceptual framework on the number of safe choices in this task, since this number
is a positive monotonic transformation of the coe cient of absolute risk aversion.
Tab. 3.3 describes the number of safe choices per treatment by gender.
Table 3.3.: Number of Choices Favoring the Safe Option in the Lottery List Task
Control Background Fixed Sum Fixed Sum & Low- High-
Risk Background risk Fixed Sum Fixed Sum
Female 57.77 50.31 52.59 51.20 51.43 53.85
(N=13) (N=42) (N=27) (N=69) (N=14) (N=13)
Male 49.54 51.80 51.80 51.80 51.58 49.54
(N=13) (N=35) (N=30) (N=65) (N=12) (N=18)
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Figure 3.2.: HL Decision Task
Decision Option A Option B
1 10% chance of $8 90% chance of $6.4 10% chance of $15.4 90% chance of $ 0.4
2 20% chance of $8 80% chance of $6.4 20% chance of $15.4 80% chance of $ 0.4
3 30% chance of $8 70% chance of $6.4 30% chance of $15.4 70% chance of $ 0.4
4 40% chance of $8 60% chance of $6.4 40% chance of $15.4 60% chance of $ 0.4
5 50% chance of $8 50% chance of $6.4 50% chance of $15.4 50% chance of $ 0.4
6 60% chance of $8 40% chance of $6.4 60% chance of $15.4 40% chance of $ 0.4
7 70% chance of $8 30% chance of $6.4 70% chance of $15.4 30% chance of $ 0.4
8 80% chance of $8 20% chance of $6.4 80% chance of $15.4 20% chance of $ 0.4
9 90% chance of $8 10% chance of $6.4 90% chance of $15.4 10% chance of $ 0.4
10 100% chance of $8 0% chance of $6.4 100% chance of $15.4 0% chance of $ 0.4
In the control treatment (Column 1), I replicate the often-reported finding that
females have significantly higher baseline risk aversion than males. Females are
about 16.6% more likely to select the safe option than males (p=0.02, Wilcoxon rank
sum test). However, the introduction of background risk (Column 2) eliminates this
common result; the di erence is no longer significant (p=0.81, Wilcoxon rank sum
test). The driver behind this result is that unrealized risk significantly increases risk
taking by females. Compared to the control treatment, the average number of safe
choices in the background-risk treatment for females is about 13% lower (p=0.04,
Wilcoxon rank sum test). In contrast, the introduction of background risk does not
have an economic or statistically significant e ect on the risk preferences of males
(p=0.60, Wilcoxon rank sum test).
I next explore the mechanisms behind this increase in risk taking for females and
examine the respective roles of income and anticipation. An e ect of the potential
income associated with the background risk is conditional on an income e ect of
assigned non-stochastic income (3.1) When comparing the number of safe choices in
the fixed-sum treatments (Column 3), I find that income also succeeds in eliminating
the gender di erence in risk aversion (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p=0.75). Compared
to the control treatment (Column 1), risk taking of females is increased by about
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9% in the fixed-sum treatments, and an e ect of non-stochastic income is therefore
directionally supported. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test, however, fails to reject the
null hypothesis of equal distribution and central tendency (p=0.12). A Kolmogorov
Smirnov test does find a di erence in distribution (p=0.08). Comparing the decisions
of females in the low-fixed-sum treatment (Column 5) with their choices in the high-
fixed-sum treatment (Column 6), I do not find a statistically significant e ect of the
level of income (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p=0.40 and Kolmogorov Smirnov test,
p=0.63).
Comparing females’ choices in the fixed-sum treatments (Column 3) with their
choices in the background-risk treatment (Column 2), there is a 4 percentage points
higher increase in risk aversion in the background-risk treatments. This is not sig-
nificant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p=0.36), thus it cannot be rejected that the e ect
of background risk on females’ risk attitude is fully driven by income e ects. As
expected by the earlier finding that unrealized risk does not a ect males’ risk pref-
erences, I find no e ect of non-stochastic income on male risk preferences (Wilcoxon
rank sum test, p=0.50 and Kolmogorov Smirnov test, p=0.60).
Figure 3.3.: Distributions of Risk Preference in the Lottery List Task by Lottery
Domain
Negative Domain Positive and Mixed Domains
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Fig. 3.3 reports the risk attitudes in the lottery list elicitation task in more detail
and displays the decisions by lottery domain. The left panel of Fig. 3.3 displays the
average percentage of choices for the safe option for the 5 negative outcome lotteries.
p=0 value of the safe option increases over each decision, with decision 1 having a
safe value that equals the highest (least negative) outcome of the lottery, and the
safe value of decision 7 having the lowest (most negative) outcome. The dotted line
in the figure depicts the risk-neutral decision for each option. Risk neutrality would
imply choosing the risky choice in decisions 6 and 7 only. The actual choices for
decisions 1 through 5 is suggestive of the risk-seeking behavior that is often observed
in the loss domain. A large proportion of people prefer the risky lottery to the safe
choice with higher expected value. For decisions 6 and 7, more than 90% of people
select the gamble, which now has a higher expected value than the safe option.
The remaining 10% of choices for the safe option may be the product of risk averse
preferences for a portion of the subject pool, or the result of a stochastic choice
process.
The panel on the right of Fig. 3.3 shows the distribution for the mixed- and the
positive-domain lottery questions. The value of the fixed sum is now increasing
over the 7 decisions, with the fixed sum of decision 7 equaling the highest lottery
outcome. Risk neutrality would imply a preference for the safe option in decisions
6 and 7. The large proportion of choices for the safe option for options 1 through
5 in both types of lotteries is indicative of risk aversion. In the mixed domain, the
preference for the safe choice appears slightly lower than in the positive domain. A
possible reason for this reduction in risk aversion is that the safe choice for the first
4 decisions can now be a certain loss, which may induce a preference for risk taking
in those questions. In questions 6 and 7, about 10 % keep selecting the gamble, even
though it has lower expected value. This may be the result of a stochastic choice
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process or a very strong preference for risk for a small proportion of subjects.
To examine the e ect of unrealized risk more closely and allow for a di erential
sensitivity to gain and loss frames, I proceed with a regression analysis of the e ect
of unrealized risk on the coe cient of relative risk aversion. This o ers the addi-
tional advantage of allowing for the e ect of individual characteristics and individual
di erences in the precision of estimates.
Table 3.4.: EUT Specification for the Lottery List Elicitation Task
Positive Domain (a) Negative Domain (b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Background risk 0.10 -0.02 0.10 0.088* -0.17** 0.09 -0.17** -0.23**
(0.065) (0.070) (0.065) (0.049) (0.076) (0.090) (0.076) (0.070)
Low-fixed sum 0.14* 0.05 0.14* 0.11* -0.11 0.01 -0.11 -0.11
(0.083) (0.105) (0.082) (0.066) (0.093) (0.106) (0.093) (0.073)
High-fixed sum 0.16* -0.10 0.16** 0.15** -0.18* 0.08 -0.18* -0.14
(0.067) (0.079) (0.067) (0.063) (0.107) (0.075) (0.107) (0.088)
Male 0.18** 0.15** -0.14* -0.17**
(0.082) (0.072) (0.083) (0.076)
Background risk x Male -0.12 -0.12 0.27** 0.37***
(0.096) (0.085) (0.118) (0.100)
Low fixed sum x Male -0.19 -0.15 0.12 0.04
(0.133) (l.117) (0.140) (0.148)
High fixed sum x Male -0.26** -0.26** 0.26** 0.18
(0.103) (0.102) (0.130) (0.121)
Cognitive reflection test 0.06*** 0.10***
(0.016) (0.022)
Age -0.01 -0.01
(0.008) (0.012)
Constant 0.55*** 0.74*** 0.55* 0.77*** 0.68*** 0.55*** 0.68*** 0.66**
(0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.188) (0.060) (0.058) (0.060) (0.269)
Observations 2870 2730 5600 5600 2870 2730 5600 5600
Subject-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***<0.001; **<0.05; *<0.01
Tab. 3.4 presents the regression results of an Expected Utility Model, assuming a
CRRA power utility function of u(x) = x– (corresponding with a CRRA coe cient
of 1-a.) The results in the first 4 columns use only the questions on the positive
domain, and columns (5) through (8) report the negative domain lottery decisions.
The results are robust to a Fechner specification of stochastic errors in the latent
choice process (not shown). Column (1) reports this model for females only, and
Column (2) for males only. Comparing the estimates of a (Constant) for females
(0.55 ) and males (0.74 ) suggest increased risk aversion for females in the positive
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domain. For females, there are significant treatment e ects for the low fixed sum
and the high fixed sum; for males, there are not. These estimates of a are in line
with the existing estimates in the literature (e.g., Harrison and Rutstroem (2008)).
In Columns (3) and (4), I allow for potential gender di erences in the e ects of
income and background risk and include interactions with gender and the treatment
indicators. In Column (4), I also allow for the e ect of age and cognitive reflection,
based on the score in the Cognitive Reflection Test developed by Frederick (2005)
that measures both cognitive capacity and attributes such as impulsivity. Columns
(3) and (4) show, as expected, that males have significantly lower baseline risk
aversion. Females significantly increase risk taking in the low-fixed sum, the high-
fixed sum and–after controlling for age and cognitive reflection–in the background
risk treatment. The increase in risk taking by females in the fixed-sum and the
background-risk treatments is considerable, as the e ects negate most of the initial
gender di erence in risk attitude: Tests do not reject that females have the same
risk preference as males in the low-sum treatment (‰2(1) = 0.77, p = 0.38, ) or the
background-risk treatment (‰2(1) = 0.57, p = 0.45) and they are significantly less
risk averse in the high-fixed-sum treatment (‰2(1) = 5.07, p = 0.02). The e ect of
background risk on females’ risk attitude can be fully explained by the income e ect,
as the equality between the three treatment indicators cannot be rejected (‰2(2) =
1.46, p = 0.48). Those who are older are more risk averse, but not significantly.
Those who score better on the Cognitive Reflection Test are significantly less risk
averse, a finding consistent with Frederick (2005), who reports more risk taking in
the gain domain for those with high cognitive reflection scores.
Next I consider the negative domain lottery decisions in Columns (5)-(8). For
the negative domain, I assume the power utility function u(x) = ≠(≠x)— so that b
<1 implies convexity in the negative domain. In Column (5), I estimate the model
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for females only, and in Column (6), for males only. The estimate of b for females
(0.68 ) and males (0.55 ) suggests that both are risk seeking in the negative domain,
but males take more risk. For females, the background risk and the high-fixed-sum
treatments significantly increase risk taking, for males they do not.
In Columns 7 and 8, I allow for gender interaction e ects with the treatment
indicators. In the baseline, males are significantly less risk averse. The background-
risk and the high-fixed-sum treatments increase risk taking for females, the increase
of risk taking in the low-fixed-sum treatment is not significant. Tests cannot reject
that females and males have equal risk preferences in the low-fixed-sum treatment
(‰2(1) = 0.59, p = 0.74) and the high-fixed-sum (‰2(1) = 2.43, p = 0.12) and
females are significantly less risk averse than males in the background risk(‰2(1) =
5.56, p = 0.002). The e ect of the fixed sums is of a similar order of magnitude as
the findings in the positive domain. The e ect of unrealized risk appears to increase
risk taking more in the negative domain than it did in the positive domain, but
tests cannot reject equality of the treatment indicators (‰2(2) = 0.59, p = 0.74) and
the e ect of the background risk can thus still be fully explained by income. In
Column (8), I allow for the e ect of Cognitive Reflection and age. In contrast to
the positive domain, Cognitive Reflection now is associated with a reduction in risk
taking. This is consistent with Frederick (2005), who also finds that high cognitive
reflection increases the likelihood that people accept a sure loss to avoid playing
a lottery with lower expected value. The e ect of background risk increases after
the introduction of these variables, but tests can still not reject the equality across
treatments (‰2(2) = 2.10, p = 0.35.)
In summary, unrealized risk reduces relative risk aversion for females, both in the
negative and the positive domains. Income is also associated with an increase in
risk taking for females and the strength of income and unrealized risk on risk taking
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cannot be distinguished. For men, there is no e ect of unrealized risk or fixed
income, except in the negative domain where receiving the high-fixed sum reduces
their risk-seeking behavior.
3.5.2. The e ect of realized risk
To study the e ect of realized risk, I focus on the answers to the Holt and Laury
task in the second part of the experiment. Fig. 3.4 plots the percentage of choices
for the safe lottery for each of the 10 decisions presented. As outlined by the dotted
line in the figure, risk neutrality would suggest a switching point after decision 4.
The fact that a large number of subjects switch later on is indicative of risk aversion.
Figure 3.4.: Percentage of Safe Choices in Holt and Laury Task
Tab. 3.56 displays the number of safe choices across treatments by gender. On
average, males choose the safe option 5.91 times, significantly less than the average
6.41 safe choices by females, (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p = 0.05). This is not driven
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by the fixed-sum treatments; in line with the findings for the lottery list elicitation
task, women take more risk in these treatments, although not significantly more
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, p=0.78). When looking at the e ect of winning after the
realization of risk, I find that the di erence across genders increases. In the control
treatment, females take 15% less risk than males; in the high-realized risk treatment,
females take over 33% less risk than males. In the low-background-risk treatment,
where people receive $2 and “lose” the realized risk, there does not appear to be an
e ect on the gender gap in risk attitudes.6
Table 3.5.: Number of Choices Favoring the Safe Option in the Holt and Laury Task
Control High- Low- Fixed Low- High- Total
Realized Risk Realized Risk Sum Fixed Sum Fixed Sum
Female 6.40 6.82 6.20 6.23 6.43 6.00 6.42
(N=10) (N=22) (N=20) (N=26) (N=14) (N=12) (N=104)
Male 5.77 5.21 5.68 6.46 6.82 6.24 5.91
(N=13) (N=14) (N=19) (N=28) (N=11) (N=17) (N=102)
The first part of the experiment ruled out an income e ect for males. In this
part, I also do not find a significant income e ect for males when comparing the
risk attitudes in the fixed-sum treatment and the control treatment (Wilcoxon rank
sum test, p=0.22). This implies that any potential increase in risk taking after the
positive realization of risk can be attributed to the winning e ect. The positive
realization of risk increases risk taking by about 22% (Wilcoxon rank sum test,
p=0.10). For females, the income e ect is no longer significant when comparing the
fixed-sum treatments and the control treatment (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p=0.77).
6Note that the observed risk attitudes in the Holt and Laury task are conditional on profits made
in the earlier lottery list elicitation task. This is unlikely to complicate the measurement of
the treatment e ects as there are no significant di erences in the obtained profits in this task
across treatments (Kruskal Wallis Test, ‰2(4) = 5.40, p=0.24). These profits are determined
by randomly selecting one of 105 decisions for payment, the impact of risk attitude and thus
the e ect of the treatment e ects in the first part on these profits are therefore negligible.
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This points at a transient e ect of income, consistent with the readjustments of
reference points and the recency e ects that are often observed in the literature
(e.g., Erev and Haruvy (2013). The gains of $30 and $2 are old news once the
second risk attitude method is implemented and, therefore, may not a ect female’s
decision making as much. When comparing risk taking in the High Realized Risk
treatment to risk taking in the fixed-sum treatments and the control treatment, I do
not find an e ect from winning on females (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p=0.39). This
is unexpected because in a reference point dependent decision model, the income
associated with winning $30, is $14 higher than the expected value of the lottery,
although this is not as high as the $30 increase in the first part of the experiment,
the induced gain frame would suggest an increase in risk taking. This suggests that
there may be a counter factor that actually reduces their desire for risk.
This comparison across treatments obscures the income di erences within treat-
ments because of the profits obtained in the lottery list elicitation task in the ex-
periment’s first part. In addition, it does not allow for individual variation. I will,
therefore, proceed with regression analyses. I estimate interval-censored models,
using the interval-censored relative risk aversion (rr) as a dependent variable, as-
suming a CRRA power utility function of u(x) = x(1≠rr)/(1 ≠ rr) (Tab. 3.6). The
results are robust to other specifications, including a simple regression on the num-
ber of safe choices (not reported.) Of the original 152 subjects, a good amount
(127) show the conventional behavior; they start o  choosing the lotteries described
under option A in the left of Fig. 3.2 and have a single switching point to the riskier
lotteries described under option B. For 23 of the 25 subjects who deviated from this
behavior, I could still calculate an interval by using the lower bound associated with
the first risky choice as the lower bound, and using the upper bound associated with
the last risky choice as the upper bound. Two subjects made a risky choice in the
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first row and a safe choice in the last; thus, I could not narrow the interval and
excluded them from the analysis.
To allow for the treatment induced income e ect, I include the indicators Get30
and Get2. Get30 reflects the subjects who are in the high-fixed-sum treatment and
the subjects in the background-risk treatment who won $30 after realization of the
risk. Get2 reflects the subjects who were in the $2 fixed-sum treatment, and those
who received $2 after realization of the risk. The indicators High-Realized Risk and
Low-Realized Risk, reflect the subjects in the background-risk treatment who only
received $30 or $2 after the dice were rolled.
In Column (1) I estimate the model for females, and in Column 2 for males. High-
realized risk increases risk taking for males and reduces risk taking for females,
but the e ect is not significant for either gender. Once I control for interactions
between gender and treatment e ects (Columns (3)-(6)), I find that males signifi-
cantly reduce their risk aversion after winning and receiving the high-realized risk
(‰2(1) = 2.70, p = 0.10) and this e ect is many magnitudes stronger than the e ect
that being male has on baseline risk attitude (‰2(1) = 2.88, p = 0.09). Females in
contrast, do not increase risk taking after winning.
In Column (4), I allow for the e ect of profits in the lottery list elicitation task. I
allow for gender-specific income e ects of the earnings in the lottery list elicitation
task, and find that higher profits in this task cause females to significantly increase
their risk attitude; for males there is no such e ect. In column (5) I allow for e ects
of age and cognitive reflection and find that older subjects have higher risk aversion.
To sum up, winning after the realization of risk increases risk taking in males,
but does not increase risk taking in females. Risk preferences of females are no
longer significantly a ected by earnings they made earlier in the experiment, but
are a ected by the more recent earnings that they made in the previous lottery list
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Table 3.6.: EUT Specification for the Lottery List Elicitation Task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
rr
Get30 -0.22 0.15 -0.15 -0.11 -0.15
(0.318) (0.173) (0.271) (0.257) (0.255)
Get2 -0.01 0.30* 0.15 0.12 0.16
(0.262) (0.170) (0.152) (0.149) (0.146)
High-realized risk 0.31 -0.34 0.31 0.29 0.32
(0.265) (0.241) (0.260) (0.253) (0.241)
Low-realized risk -0.07 -0.32** -0.19 -0.16 -0.18
(0.186) (0.150) (0.122) (0.124) (0.121)
Male -0.11 -0.15 -0.14
(0.101) (0.103) (0.102)
Male x Get30 0.25 0.21 0.28
(0.294) (0.284) (0.285)
Male x High-realized risk -0.66* -0.64* -0.71**
(0.357) (0.353) (0.358)
LLT Profits -0.01** -0.01**
(0.006) (0.006)
LLT Profits x male 0.01 0.01
(0.008) (0.008)
Age 0.05**
(0.021)
CRT -0.01
(0.046)
Constant 0.72*** 0.49*** 0.65*** 0.69*** -0.34
(0.208) (0.106) (0.133) (0.127) (0.485)
lnsigma
Constant -0.57*** -0.73*** -0.64*** -0.66*** -0.67***
(0.159) (0.164) (0.113) (0.113) (0.115)
Observations 760 740 1500 1500 1500
Subject-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***<0.001; **<0.05; *<0.01
elicitation task.
3.6. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper shows that there are stark gender di erences in the way men and
women respond to a risky environment. I find that a positive outcome background
risk temporarily increases risk taking in females but not in males. Although baseline
risk aversion for females exceeds that of males, the introduction of background risk
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eliminates this di erence. A potential e ect of anticipation cannot be completely
discarded, but the results suggest that this is driven by the e ect of income, to
which males are not sensitive. In contrast, once the outcome of the background
risk is revealed and subjects ’win’ the risk and receive the high outcome, risk taking
increases in males but not in females.
Increased sensitivity to income for females is consistent with the predictions of
utility functions such as the isoelastic utility function. For these functions, the higher
baseline risk aversion of females implies higher sensitivity to previous earnings. This
result is applicable to EUT models with narrow framing, and –as long as reference
points have not been updated to take these earnings into account– reference-point
dependent models such as CPT. However, the complete lack of response to income by
males suggests that they are not a ected by their previous experimental earnings.
Their behavior is consistent with a decision model such as Expected Utility over
Income (EUI). This model stipulates a scenario of even ’narrower’ framing in which
people only consider the potential earnings of a prospect, and are not a ected by
any previous earnings.
The increase of risk taking in males after the experience of winning the lottery is
in line with studies on all-male subjects that find an increase in risk taking after the
experience of a win (Apicella et al., 2014). The reason that females do not increase
risk taking after a win is potentially driven by a di erent emotional or hormonal
response (testosterone has been suggested to be a major driver of the winner’s
e ect). Winning may also a ect beliefs on the likelihood of winning subsequent
risks di erently for females; they may be less prone to hot-hand beliefs, or be more
prone to the gambler’s fallacy and believe that their luck ran out after the recent
win.
It is left to future research to replicate these findings, to study the e ects of negative-
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outcome risks, and to more closely investigate the mechanisms behind these gender
di erences. It is possible that the genders are by nature di erently disposed towards
risk, but the di erences may also be socially constructed, or be a consequence of
special circumstances that vary across gender. For example, females may have lower
expected incomes, or lower reference points of income; this may be a driver in the
gender di erences in baseline risk attitude as well as their increased sensitivity to
income.
The finding that the exposure to past and current risks a ects decision-making
supports a more dynamic view of risk taking, and can be a motivation for policy
interventions to mitigate this threat to optimal judgment and decision-making. The
winning e ect and the income e ect may also be used to induce changes in risk
taking. In cases where increases in risk taking are not desirable, such as in a financial-
trading setting, withholding the outcomes of previously acquired risks may improve
decision-making in males. In instances where increases in risk taking by females is
desirable, such as in a micro-finance setting, repeated stimuli may induce the desired
e ect.
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4. When Performance Trumps
Gender Bias: Joint Versus
Separate Evaluation 1
4.1. Introduction
Gender-based discrimination in hiring, promotion, and job assignments is di cult
to overcome (e.g., (Neumark et al., 1996; Rich and Riach, 2002). In addition to
conscious taste-based or statistical discrimination (Becker, 1976), gender biases are
automatically activated as soon as evaluators learn the sex of a person. Biases
lead to unintentional and implicit discrimination that is not based on a rational
assessment of the usefulness of sex in predicting future performance (e.g.,Banaji
and Greenwald, 1995 ,Bertrand et al., 2005). For example, science faculty rated
a male candidate who applied for a laboratory manager position as significantly
more competent and hireable than an otherwise identical female candidate, and
this di erential evaluation was moderated by the faculty’s pre-existing bias against
women (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012).
The most e ective mechanisms to date to decrease the impact of such biases are
1This is joint work with Iris Bohnet and Max Bazerman and is currently under review for publi-
cation
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blind evaluation procedures in which musicians audition behind a curtain. These
methods have proven to substantially decrease gender discrimination in the selection
of musicians for orchestras, but they are not very practical for most other evaluation
and selection problems (Rouse and Goldin, 2000). Other attempts at overcoming
gender biases include diversity training, which, however, seems to have had little im-
pact (Dobbin et al., 2007). Gender quotas on search and evaluation committees have
had mixed results, given that stereotypes tend to a ect both male and female evalu-
ators (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2010). Quotas—e.g., for
political bodies, corporate boards or senior management—are e ective in increasing
the fraction of members from underrepresented groups and with enough exposure
to counter-stereotypic evidence, have been shown to a ect gender stereotypes but
have had mixed e ects on performance (Miller and Matsa, 2013; Duflo et al., 2009,
2012).
Generally, there seems to be less room for discrimination, the more specific and
equally available evaluation and selection criteria are (Reskin and Bielby, 2005).
Building on this literature, this paper suggests a new intervention aimed at over-
coming biased assessments: an “evaluation nudge,” in which people are evaluated
jointly rather than separately regarding their future performance2. We expect cog-
nitive shortcuts, such as group stereotypes, to have less of an impact when multiple
candidates are presented simultaneously and evaluated comparatively than when
evaluators look at one person at a time.
Both, joint and separate evaluation procedures are common for hiring and promo-
tion decisions. Based on a recent survey of senior business executives in US compa-
nies with more than 1,000 employees (Penn, Schoen Berland Associates, inc., 2012),
2A nudge is any aspect of choice design that is based on psychological insights into how our minds
work and that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without restricting the freedom of
individual choice. For nudges more generally, see Thaler and Sunstein, 2009.
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in 30 percent of all promotion decisions, only one candidate was considered. For
hiring decisions, we rely on the literature on sequential vs. non-sequential searches,
building on Stigler (1961). In sequential search, a firm screens each applicant upon
arrival and o ers the job to the first applicant whose productivity exceeds a certain
threshold. In non-sequential searches, a firm pools a number of applicants, screens
them and o ers the job to the best person in the pool.The former search strategy
resembles separate and the latter joint evaluation. Recruitment strategies vary with
firm and job characteristics but overall, about half of the hiring procedures studied
seem to correspond to sequential (separate evaluation) and half to non-sequential
(joint evaluation) searches (Ommeren and Russo, 2013; Oyer and Schaefer, 2011).
Unfortunately, neither the promotion nor the hiring literature has examined the
gender impacts of the di erent hiring and promotion strategies.
We employ laboratory experiments to examine whether evaluating candidates
jointly rather than separately leads to individual performance playing a more im-
portant role than group stereotypes. In our experiments, we have subjects assume
the role of either evaluators or candidates. Evaluators assess the likely future per-
formance of candidates either in separate or joint evaluation of their performance.
Specifically, they are informed of candidates’ past performance and their sex (plus
a number of filler characteristics) and are asked to decide whether given candidates
are suitable for given jobs, either evaluating them separately or jointly, in one of
two sex-typed tasks, a math or a verbal task. Most studies that measure explicit
gender attitudes find that females are believed to be worse at math and better at
verbal tasks than males(Perie et al., 2004; Price, 2011). Implicit association tests
(IATs) measuring people’s implicit attitudes report math and verbal skills to be
associated with maleness and femaleness respectively (Greenwald and Banaji, 2002;
Plante et al., 2009). The evidence on actual performance di erences between the
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genders is mixed and varies by country and population, sometimes finding support
for a gender gap in the expected direction, sometimes finding no gender di erences,
and, in recent years, finding a reversal of the gender gap in mathematics in sev-
eral countries (Guiso et al., 2008). Despite the mixed evidence, we expect gendered
beliefs to be sticky and these tasks to create stereotype-advantaged and stereotype-
disadvantaged groups, with men being stereotype-advantaged in the math task and
women in the verbal task. In addition, we expect that members of these groups
will be a ected by these biases even when at the individual level, conditional on the
information available on the individual, gender is not informative and should not
impact the evaluation. Although in an organizational context, additional complex-
ities come into play, our framework relates to hiring, assignment, and promotion
decisions where evaluators evaluate a given candidate’s suitability for a specific job.
Our work is inspired by findings in psychology suggesting that people make more
rational choices when examining products jointly rather than separately. We model
a potential change in candidate assessments depending on the evaluation mode by
introducing a simple behavioral model of information processing in which evalua-
tors overweight the importance of the characteristics of the group that the candidate
belongs to. In joint evaluation, more potentially counter-stereotypical data points
are available at a time than in separate evaluation, thus providing evaluators with
more information to update their stereotypical beliefs. The di erence in the amount
of available information could lead evaluators to choose a lower-performing stereo-
typical person in separate evaluation but a higher-performing counter-stereotypical
person in joint evaluation.
In our experiment, gender was not correlated with task performance. Still, gen-
der stereotypes had a strong and significant impact on evaluators’ candidate as-
sessments. Evaluators were significantly more likely to focus on group stereotypes
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in separate than in joint evaluation and on the past performance of the individual
in joint than in separate evaluation, making joint evaluation the profit-maximizing
evaluation procedure.
Our experimental findings have implications for the design of hiring and pro-
motions procedures. Organizations may seek to overcome biases in hiring, job as-
signment and promotion because they want to maximize economic returns. They
may worry about the inaccuracy of stereotypes in predicting future productivity,
or they may hold gender equality as a goal in itself. Introducing joint rather than
separate evaluation procedures may enable them to nudge evaluators toward taking
individual performance information into account rather than gender stereotypes.
Our paper is organized as follows: Part 2 o ers a conceptual framework, Part 3
describes the experimental design, Part 4 reports our experimental results and Part
5 concludes.
4.2. Conceptual Framework
Our evaluation nudge builds on the observation in behavioral decision research that
people make more rational decisions in joint than in separate evaluation modes.
These evaluation procedures may provide di erent amounts of data that allow eval-
uators to update their (possibly biased) beliefs on group characteristics to various
degrees.
A simple Bayesian model of information processing may illustrate this. We assume
that evaluators are informed of candidate(s)’ individual past performance in a given
task, their sex and the average past performance of the pool of candidates. Based on
the information received, evaluators have to decide whether to “hire” the candidate
(s) presented to them for future performance in the task or go back to the pool and
be allocated a candidate at random. Evaluators are paid based on their candidates’
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future performance and thus have an incentive to select who they believe to be most
productive, based on the candidate’s future expected performance.
Evaluators either evaluate one candidate at a time (separate evaluation) or two
candidates at a time (joint evaluation). In both conditions, evaluators hire one
candidate only, either by selecting one of the candidates presented or by going back
to the pool and being allocated a random candidate.
A “behavioral” Bayesian model of information processing (that allows evaluators
to take irrelevant group characteristics into account) can explain an increase in the
likelihood that evaluators choose higher-performing candidates in joint as compared
to separate evaluation. Evaluating more than one person at a time implies having
more data points available on the candidate’s relative performance to update prior
biased beliefs. If the new information is counter-stereotypical, it could theoretically
shift beliefs enough for the evaluator to choose a counter-stereotypical person for a
given job in joint but not in separate evaluation. We present this approach more
formally in Appendix A. It yields the following empirically testable hypothesis:
Candidates are more likely to be selected based on their performance when eval-
uated jointly and more likely to be selected based on their gender when evaluated
separately.
Our model is inspired by earlier work in psychology suggesting that evaluation
modes a ect the quality of decisions by making evaluators switch from more intuitive
decision-making in separate evaluation, to more accurate choices in joint evaluation.
This often is attributed to the System 1/System 2 distinction where people are as-
sumed to have two distinct modes of thinking that are variously activated under
certain conditions: the intuitive and automatic System 1 and the reflective and
reasoned System 2 (Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman, 2011). Specifically, it
has been suggested that the lack of comparison information available in separate
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evaluation leads people to invoke intuitively available internal referents (Kahneman
and Miller’s norm theory), focus on the attributes that can be most easily cali-
brated (Hsee’s evaluability hypothesis), and rely more on emotional desires than on
reasoned analysis (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni’s want/should propo-
sition).
Loewenstein and Bazerman (1992)provided the original demonstration of prefer-
ence reversals between joint and separate evaluation. In a two-party negotiation,
they had study participants evaluate two possible negotiation outcomes—an even
split of a smaller pie and a disadvantageous uneven split of a larger pie that still
made both parties better o —either one at a time or jointly. When presented sepa-
rately, most people preferred the equal split; when presented jointly, most preferred
the money-maximizing alternative. Later studies on joint versus separate prefer-
ence reversals found that brand name was more important than product features
and price when people evaluated products separately rather than jointly (Nowlis
and Simonson, 1997); people were willing to pay more to protect animal species
when evaluating separately and to invest in human health when evaluating the two
causes jointly Ritov et al. (1993); and people were willing to pay more for a small
portion of ice cream in a tiny, over-filled container when evaluating separately but
for a large portion of ice cream in an under-filled huge container when evaluating
the two serving options jointly Hsee et al. (1999).
4.3. Experimental Design
Our experiment was conducted in the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory. We
had 180 subjects participate as “candidates” in a math or a verbal task, and 328
subjects assumed the role of “evaluators,” selecting one of the candidate for fu-
ture performance in the task. All were American college students. We employed
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equal numbers of male and female evaluators. All our participants were identified
by code numbers and remained anonymous to each other and to the experimenter.
We employed a 2x2x2x2 experimental main (between-subject) design in which the
key treatment condition of interest was the evaluation mode, joint or separate. In
addition, we varied the individual candidates’ past performance levels and their gen-
der. Finally, candidates participated in either a math or a verbal task, with men
being the stereotype-advantaged group in the math task and women the stereotype-
advantaged group in the verbal task. The experiment was programmed and con-
ducted in two stages, using Z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007) Fischbacher 2007,
sample instructions are included in Appendix B).
In stage 1, candidates participated in either a verbal or a math task and were paid
based on their performance. In stage 2, evaluators were informed of candidates’ past
performance and their gender and then were asked to select a candidate for future
performance in the same task. In stage 1, the candidates participating in the verbal
task engaged in a word-search puzzle. They were given a list of 20 words and were
instructed to mark as many of the words as they could find in three minutes in
a matrix containing letters (Bohnet and Saidi (2011)). Most letters appeared in
random order, but some formed words, and participants could search horizontally,
vertically, and diagonally. On average, the 100 candidates participating in this task
found 10 words (SD=3.81) in the first round and 12 words (SD=4.56) in the second
round.
The math task involved correctly adding as many sets of five two-digit numbers as
possible (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle et al., 2013). On average, the 80
candidates who participated in this task solved 10 problems correctly (SD=3.09) in
the first round and 10 problems (SD=3.35) in the second round. After completing
their task, participants filled out a short demographic questionnaire (most impor-
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tantly for us, indicating their gender). Candidates then were paid based on their
performance and were not informed of Stage 2 of the experiment.
In stage 2, evaluators in both the verbal and the math tasks were asked to choose
a candidate, knowing that they would be paid based on that candidate’s Round
2-performance. They could either choose the candidate presented to them, or go
back to the pool and accept a randomly selected person. They had the candidate’s
Round 1-performance and his or her gender available as a basis for their decision,
and were informed that on average, evaluators in the pool had provided 10 correct
answers (as was the case for both tasks). To make the gender-attribute less salient,
without creating any additional demographic variation, we took advantage of the
demographic similarity of our candidates and provided evaluators with truthful filler
information on their candidates’ characteristics. In addition to learning a person’s
sex and past performance, evaluators were also informed that he or she was a student,
American, and from the greater Boston area.
The candidates presented to the evaluators were either average or slightly below-
average performers, having provided either 10 or 9 correct answers in the first round.
We chose first-round performance scores at and below the mean performance level
of the pool to make sure that our results were not driven exclusively by evaluators’
risk (or loss) aversion. Presenting rather precise performance indicators compared
to most performance measures in the field and using fewer possible criteria than
typical in practice provides a conservative test for the impact of gender stereotypes.
Heuristics likely play a more important role in situations where performance cannot
be objectively measured (Stainback et al., 2010) and where multiple criteria for
evaluation are available as they allow evaluators to focus on specific criteria only to
justify their biased decisions (Norton et al., 2004). In our design, it seems di cult
to justify neglecting individual performance information collected for the same task
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in the previous round.
In the separate-evaluation condition, evaluators were presented with either a male
or a female candidate who was either an average- or below-average performer. We
randomly selected four candidates of the required gender-performance combinations
from our pool: Male-10, Female-10, Male-9, and Female-9, with identical filler char-
acteristics. In the joint-evaluation condition, evaluators were presented with a male
and a female candidate simultaneously, drawing from the same candidates used in
the separate-evaluation condition. The candidates di ered on both gender and past
performance, leading to two possible combinations: Male-10/Female-9 and Male-
9/Female-10.
After the experiment was completed, evaluators participated in an incentivized
risk-attitude assessment task (Holt and Laury, 2002) and completed a short ques-
tionnaire that collected basic demographic information. Evaluators were paid based
on their decision, i.e. either the chosen candidate’s second-round performance or
the randomly allocated candidate’s second-round performance. They received $1
for every correct answer that the candidate had provided. Evaluator earnings varied
between $17.8 and $34.75, which included a $10 show-up fee, experimental earnings,
and the payment for the risk-attitude assessment task.
In addition to our main experiment, we ran a small control experiment in which
we informed evaluators about candidates’ present rather than past performance.
Specifically, evaluators were informed of an candidate’s second-round performance
and then had to decide whether or not to select this candidate and be paid based on
the candidate’s performance in the second round or go back to the pool and accept
a randomly allocated candidate. This experiment was designed to distinguish belief-
based from taste-based discrimination. While in our main experiment, both motives
could lead to gender-based decisions, in the control experiment, only taste-based dis-
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crimination was possible. We replicated the separate-evaluation conditions, in which
we expected gender to be most prevalent, and used average performers, the group
we were most concerned about being discriminated against. For separate evalua-
tion, 23 evaluators participated in the male math condition, 27 in the female math
condition, 33 in the male verbal condition, and 27 in the female verbal condition.
Other than giving evaluators information about candidates’ present rather than past
performance, the control study was run identically to our main experiment. After
participants had made their decisions, learned their outcomes, and given us their
demographic information, they presented their code number and were given a sealed
envelope containing their earnings.
4.4. Results
We first present candidates’ performance in the two tasks, then examine what role
gender and individual performance played in the two di erent evaluation modes,
and finally examine alternative explanations.
4.4.1. Candidates’ performance
We first examine whether or not having gender-stereotypical beliefs was accurate
in our context. There were no significant gender di erences in performance on ei-
ther task, although directionally, the small di erences we did observe accord with
stereotypical assumptions3. Thus, ex-post, statistical discrimination was unwar-
3In the math task, performance levels were as follows: Round 1, men: Mean=10.63, SD=3.41;
women: Mean=10.33, SD= 2.78; p=0.67. Round 2, men: Mean=10.63, SD=3.57; women:
Mean=9.95, SD =3.13; p=0.37. In the verbal task, performance levels were as follows: Round
1, men: Mean=9.82, SD=4.05; women: Mean=10.98, SD=3.49; p=0.13. Round 2, men:
Mean=12.46, SD=4.27; women: Mean=12.08, SD=4.87; p=0.68. There are no significant
di erences in variance across the genders, and the distributions in performance are not signifi-
cantly di erent according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
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ranted. In addition, information on group characteristics in our experiment was
always combined with individual performance information. Conditional on this per-
formance information, stereotypes were completely irrelevant for predicting future
performance.
Tab. 4.1reports the regression results of individual past (first-round) performance
and gender on future (second-round) performance for both tasks. Columns 1 and
3 show that first-round performance was highly correlated with second-round per-
formance, while the gender of the candidate was irrelevant for second-round perfor-
mance in both tasks. In Columns 2 and 4, we control for potential gender di er-
ences in the relationship between first- and second-round performance and include
an interaction term between the two variables. For example, the strong first-round
performance of a candidate from a stereotype-disadvantaged group could be due to
luck and thus be less predictive of future performance than the same performance by
a member of a stereotype-advantaged group (and vice versa for low performance).
Columns 2 and 4 suggest that first-round performance was equally predictive of
future performance for both genders.4
4.4.2. Evaluators’ choices
We start by aggregating across both evaluation modes and both performance levels.
In the math task (N=138), the likelihood that the stereotype-disadvantaged candi-
date, i.e., the woman, was chosen was 0.4, and the likelihood that the stereotype-
4In addition to controlling for the gender-specific randomness of performance across rounds, we
also examined the possibility of gender-specific learning across rounds. On average and across
both genders, little learning between rounds took place in the math task, while candidates
in the verbal task performed significantly better in the second than in the first round, with
men finding 2.64 and women 1.1 words more on average in the second than in the first round.
However, the gender di erence in learning was not significant, including in GLS regressions on
performance in both rounds. Similar to the above results, average performance across both
rounds was similarly correlated with the first-round performance of men and women in both
tasks.
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Table 4.1.: The E ect of Past Performance and Stereotypes on Future (Second-
Round) Performance
Math Task Verbal Task
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First-round Performance 0.849*** 0.797*** 0.708*** 0.813**
(0.08) (0.15) (0.10) (0.15)
Male Candidate 0.420 -0.481 1.201 3.118
(0.46) (1.91) (0.77) (2.42)
First-round Performance 0.086 -0.183
xmale (0.17) (0.20)
Constant 1.189 1.723 4.311* 3.158
(0.97) (1.66) (1.35) (1.95)
N 80 80 100 100
R2 0.6217 0.6232 0.3423 0.3478
Notes: Each specification is an OLS regression. Robust standard errors in
brackets. The dependent variable isthe number of correctly added sequences
in round 2 for the math task and the number of words found in round 2 for
the word task. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5
percent level.* Significant at the 10 percent level.
advantaged man was chosen was 0.46. In the verbal task (N=145), the likelihood
that the stereotype-disadvantaged man was chosen across conditions was 0.39, while
the likelihood that the stereotype-advantaged woman was chosen across conditions
was 0.5. Thus, evaluators had a slight preference for men in math tasks and for
women in verbal tasks, but these di erences are not significant.
Looking at the two evaluation modes separately, we find that these di erences
were entirely driven by the stereotype-advantaged group being preferred in separate
evaluation: Across both tasks and when evaluated separately (N=202), the likeli-
hood that a candidate from the stereotype-advantaged group was chosen was 0.66,
and the likelihood that someone from the stereotype-disadvantaged group was cho-
sen was 0.49 (‰2(1) = 5.45, p < .05). In joint evaluation (N=252), stereotypes did
not matter at all: 32 percent of the evaluators chose a candidate from the advan-
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taged group and 31 percent chose a candidate from the disadvantaged group. (The
remainder of the evaluators, 37 percent, decided to go back to the pool.)
Generally, the likelihood that a given candidate was chosen was higher in separate
than in joint evaluation. We attribute this to the number of options available in
separate versus joint evaluation. If evaluators had chosen randomly, a given candi-
date would have been chosen by 50 percent of the evaluators in separate evaluation
and by only 33 percent in joint evaluation. Thus, compared to random selection,
the stereotype-advantaged candidates were significantly more likely to be chosen
than what a random process would have predicted in separate (‰2(1)=9.18, p<.01)
but not in joint evaluation (‰2(1) =.16, p=.69). The likelihood that stereotype-
disadvantaged candidates were chosen did not di er from chance in either mecha-
nism (for separate: ‰2(1)=.04, p=.8445; for joint: ‰2(1)=0.59, p=.4424).
Generally, our results hold for both the verbal and the math task. Tab. 4.2 shows
our results for each evaluation mode, task, gender and performance level. In separate
evaluation, the gender gaps in the likelihood of being selected are apparent, with
the stereotype-advantaged group being favored in both the math and the verbal
tasks. In joint evaluation, a performance gap emerged, with the higher-performing
candidates being more likely to be selected than lower performers. Performance
does not seem to matter in separate evaluation in the math task (but, in addition
to gender, is relevant in the verbal task), and gender does not seem to matter in
either task in joint evaluation.
To examine the significance of these results, we ran regressions. Tab. 4.3 shows
that gender only a ected decisions in separate evaluation (Column 1), and per-
formance only a ected decisions in joint evaluation (Column 2). Members of the
stereotype-advantaged group were significantly more likely to be chosen in the sep-
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Table 4.2.: Likelihood of Candidate Selection in Separate and Joint Evaluation
Separate Evaluation Joint Evaluation
Male Female Male Female
Math Task
Higher Performer 0.66 0.44 0.52 0.57
(N=29) (N=32) (N=31) (N=35)
Lower Performer 0.65 0.53 0.03 0.06
(N=26) (N=30) (N=35) (N=31)
Verbal Task
Higher Performer 0.64 0.81 0.52 0.55
(N=22) (N=21) (N=31) (N=29)
Lower Performer 0.35 0.50 0.07 0.16
(N=20) (N=22) (N=29) (N=31)
arate evaluation mode but not in the joint evaluation mode. In contrast, higher-
performing candidates were only favored in joint but not in separate evaluation.
Columns 3 and 4 include controls for the risk attitudes and the gender of the evalu-
ator. Male and more risk- tolerant evaluators were less likely than female and more
risk-averse evaluators to select a given candidate than to go for the random option.
Both of these results accord with the intuition that individuals liking risk more
should be more likely to participate in the lottery of random candidate assignment
than people liking risk less.
4.4.3. Alternative explanation: taste-based discrimination
To test whether choices of evaluators were indeed based on biased expectations
of future performance rather than on a preference for men for math and women
for verbal tasks (taste-based discrimination), we ran a control experiment with an
additional 110 subjects where evaluators were informed of their candidate’s current
performance and asked whether they wanted to hire that candidate for the current
round or be allocated a random person from the pool. In our control experiments,
we replicated the separate-evaluation condition for higher-performing candidates to
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Table 4.3.: The E ect of past performance and Stereotypes on Candidate Selection,
Marginal E ects at Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Separate Joint Separate plus controls Joint plus controls
First-round performance 0.099 0.462** 0.117 0.472***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Stereotype-Advantage 0.165** 0.009 0.164** 0.008
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Math -0.009 -0.043 0.018 -0.040
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Risk Tolerance -0.059*** -0.002
(0.02) (0.01)
Male Evaluator -0.099 -0.199***
(0.07) (0.05)
Decision Outcomes 202 252 202 252
R2 0.0271 0.2201 0.0664 0.2579
Notes: Each specification is a Probit regression, marginal e ects reported in percentage points. The
dependent variable in the separate treatment is the selection of a given candidate. In the joint treatment
we score two outcomes for each individual: namely, whether the employer selected the higher (1) or the
lower (2) performer: This implies a total of 252 outcomes. Robust standard errors are in brackets and
adjusted for clustering at the employer level. Risk tolerance is measured by the numberof risky choices
made in a lottery (identical to Holt and Laury (2002). *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant
at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
examine whether the focus on group characteristics in our first set of experiments
was driven by stereotypical beliefs about group performance in the two tasks or by
an (implicit) distaste of female candidates for math tasks and male candidates for
verbal tasks.
We did not find any evidence for taste-based discrimination in our experiment.
Across the two tasks, the likelihood that a member of the stereotype-advantaged
group was chosen was 0.46, and the likelihood that a member of the stereotype-
disadvantaged group was chosen was 0.43. Specifically, instead of going back to the
pool, in the math task (N=50), 35 percent of the evaluators chose the male candidate
and 41 percent chose the female candidate; in the verbal task (N=60), 55 percent
chose the male and 56 percent the female candidate. None of these di erences are
significant; women and men were just as likely to be chosen for both tasks.
74
4.5. Conclusions
This paper examines whether an “evaluation nudge,” namely evaluating candidates
jointly rather than separately, can overcome gender-biased assessments of job can-
didates that prefer men for male-typed tasks and women for female-typed tasks,
even if gender is not predictive of future performance and more reliable individ-
ual performance measures are available. We find that when evaluators are tasked
with choosing a candidate for future performance in a math or a verbal task, a
joint-evaluation mode helps them focus on individual performance, irrespective of
candidates’ gender and evaluator bias: evaluators were significantly more likely to
choose the higher- rather than the lower-performing candidate in this mode. In
contrast, in separate evaluation, evaluators were heavily influenced by a candidate’s
gender, even though gender was not predictive of future performance and individual
past performance was: they were significantly more likely to choose men for the
math task and women for the verbal task.
Joint evaluation may a ect choices by providing additional data that evaluators
can use to update their stereotypical beliefs about a group to which a candidate
belongs. By definition, an evaluator has more data points available in joint than in
separate evaluation. If these data points provide counter-stereotypical information,
they may shift an evaluator’s beliefs about the group enough to make him or her
choose counter-stereotypically.
Our work is in line with extensive work in behavioral decision making suggesting
that people may evaluate products di erently in joint than in separate evaluation.
This research attributed di erences in decision outcomes to a switch in judgment
modes from a more intuitive mode based on heuristics in separate evaluation to a
more reasoned mode when comparing alternatives in joint evaluation (Gino et al.,
2011; Kassam et al., 2009; Bazerman and Moore, 2012).
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Our findings have implications for organizations that want to decrease the likeli-
hood that hiring, promotion, and job-assignment decisions will be based on irrele-
vant criteria triggered by stereotypes. Joint evaluation is common for many hiring
decisions but rare for job assignments and for promotion decisions. Organizations
concerned about discrimination in this later phase might want to review how, for
example, career-relevant jobs are assigned or how promotion decisions are made.
According to the Corporate Gender Gap Report 2010(Zahidi and Ibarra, 2010), in
most countries, fewer than 10 percent of career-relevant jobs are held by women.
In many academic fields, including economics, controlling for performance, women
are less likely to be granted tenure than men (Ginther and Kahn, 2004; Kahn and
Ginther, 2006).
Organizations can move from separate-evaluation to joint-evaluation procedures
to promote more accurate decision-making and maximize performance. In addi-
tion to being a profit-maximizing decision procedure, joint evaluation is also a fair
mechanism, as it encourages judgments based on people’s performance rather than
their demographic characteristics. Companies concerned about discrimination might
choose to review how job candidates are evaluated, how jobs are assigned and pro-
motion decisions made. Our work suggests that organizations can nudge evaluators
toward taking individual performance information rather than gender stereotypes
into account.
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A. Appendix chapter 2
A.1. Experimental Instructions
A.1.1. Dospert Questionnaire
Question 1
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging
in each activity or behavior. Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:
1 (very unlikely) 5 (very likely)
1. Admitting that your tastes are di erent from those of your friends. (S)
2. Going camping in the wilderness, beyond the civilization of a campground.
(R)
3. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (G)
4. Buying an illegal drug for your own use. (H)
5. Cheating on an exam. (E)
6. Chasing a tornado or hurricane by car to take dramatic photos. (R)
7. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (I)
8. Consuming five or more servings of alcohol in a single evening. (H)
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9. Cheating by a significant amount on your income tax return. (E)
10. Disagreeing with your father on a major issue. (S)
11. Betting a day’s income at a high stake poker game. (G)
12. Having an a air with a married man or woman. (E)
13. Forging somebody’s signature. (E)
14. Passing o  somebody else’s work as your own. (E)
15. Going on a vacation in a third-world country without prearranged travel and
hotel accommodations. (R)
16. Arguing with a friend about an issue on which he or she has a very di erent
opinion. (S)
17. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability or closed. (R)
18. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (I)
19. Approaching your boss to ask for a raise. (S)
20. Illegally copying a piece of software. (E)
21. Going whitewater rafting during rapid water flows in the spring. (S)
22. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (e.g. baseball,
soccer, or football). (G)
23. Telling a friend if his or her significant other has made a pass at you. (S)
24. Investing 5% of your annual income in a conservative stock. (I)
25. Shoplifting a small item (e.g. a lipstick or a pen). (E)
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26. Wearing provocative or unconventional clothes on occasion. (S)
27. Engaging in unprotected sex. (H)
28. Stealing an additional TV cable connection o  the one you pay for. (E)
29. Not wearing a seatbelt when being a passenger in the front seat. (H)
30. Investing 10% of your annual income in government bonds (treasury bills). (I)
31. Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g. mountain climbing or sky
diving). (S)
32. Not wearing a helmet when riding a motorcycle. (H)
33. Gambling a week’s income at a casino. (G)
34. Taking a job that you enjoy over one that is prestigious but less enjoyable. (S)
35. Defending an unpopular issue that you believe in at a social occasion. (S)
36. Exposing yourself to the sun without using sunscreen. (H)
37. Trying out bungee jumping at least once. (R)
38. Piloting your own small plane, if you could. (R)
39. Walking home alone at night in a somewhat unsafe area of town. (H)
40. Regularly eating high cholesterol foods. (H)
Question 2
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the
outcome or consequences will be and for which there is the possibility of negative
consequences. However, riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and we are
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interested in your gut level assessment of how risky each situation or behavior is.
For each of the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each
situation to be. Provide a rating from Not at all Risky to Extremely Risky, using
the following scale: 1 (very unlikely) 5 (very likely)
Question 3
The actions described in each of these statements can lead to a good outcome.
For each of the following statements, please indicate the benefits you would obtain
from each situation in case of a good outcome Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using
the following scale: 1 (no high benefit) 5 (very high benefit)
Question 4
The actions described in each of these statements can lead to a bad outcome. For
each of the following statements, please indicate the costs you would obtain from
each situation in case of a bad outcome. Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the
following scale: 1 (not costly) 5 (very costly).
Question 5
For each of the following statements, please indicate the probability you will obtain
the good outcome. Provide a rating from 0 to 1, using the following scale: 0 (zero
probability), 0.1 (10 % probability), 1 (certainty. )
A.1.2. Generalized Anxiety Disorder Test (GAD)
1. Do you experience excessive worry? Yes No
2. Is your worry excessive in intensity, frequency, or amount of distress it causes?
Yes No
3. Do you find it di cult to control your worry (or stop worrying) once it starts?
Yes No
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4. Do you worry excessively and uncontrollably about minor things such as being
late for an appointment, minor repairs, homework, etc.? Yes No
5. Please list the most frequent topics about which you worry excessively and
uncontrollably: a. d. b. e. c. f.
6. During the last six months~ have you been bothered by excessive and uncon-
trollable worries more days than not? Yes No
IF YES,CONTINUE. IF NO, SKIP REMAINING QUESTIONS.
7. During the past six months, have you often been bothered by any of the
following symptoms? Place a check next to each symptom that you have had
more days than not:
__ Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge
__ Di culty falling/staying asleep or restless/unsatisfying sleep
__ Di culty concentrating or mind going blank
__ Irritability
__ Being easily fatigued
__ Muscle tension
8. How much do worry and physical symptoms interfere with your life, work,
social activities, family, etc.?
Circle one number: 012345678, where 0 Is none, 2 is mildly, 4 is moderately,
6 Is severely and and 8 is very severely 9.
9. How much are you bothered by worry and physical symptoms (how much
distress does it cause you)?
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Circle one number: 012345678, where 0 Is no distress, 2 is mild distress, 4 is
moderate distress, 6 Is severe distress and 8 is very severe distress
A.1.3. Cognitive Reflection and Risk Proficiency
Cognitive Reflection Test
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
100 machines to make 100 widgets?
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If
it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take
for the patch to cover half of the lake?
Risk Proficiency Test
1. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these
50 throws how many times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1,
3 or 5)
a) 5 out of 50 throws
b) 25 out of 50 throws
c) 30 out of 50 throws
d) None of the above
2. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these
500 members in the choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are
not in the choir 300 are men. What is the probability that a randomly drawn
man is a member of the choir? Please indicate the probability in percent
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a) 10%
b) 25%
c) 40%
d) None of the above
3. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The probability that the die
shows a 6 is twice as high as the probability of each of the other numbers. On
average, out of these 70 throws, about how many times would the die show
the number 6?
A.1.4. Lottery Based Risk Attitude Elicitation Tasks
Figure A.1.: Lottery List Decision Task
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Hypothetical Gamble Questions
1. Suppose that a distant relative left you a share in a private business worth
one million dollars. You are immediately faced with a choice — whether to
cash out now and take the one million dollars, or to wait until the company
goes public in one month, which would give you a 50–50 chance of doubling
your money to two million dollars and a 50–50 chance of losing one-third of
it, leaving you 667 thousand dollars. Would you cash out immediately or wait
until after the company goes public?
a) Cash out
b) Wait
c) Do not know
2. Suppose that waiting a month, until after the company goes public, would
result in a 50–50 chance that the money would be doubled to two million
dollars and a 50– 50 chance that it would be reduced by half, to 500 thousand
dollars. Would you cash out immediately and take the one million dollars, or
wait until the company goes public?
a) Cash out
b) Wait
c) Do not know
3. Suppose the chances were 50–50 that waiting would double your money to
two million dollars and 50–50 that it would reduce it by seventy-five percent,
to 250 thousand dollars. Would you cash out immediately and take the one
million dollars, or wait until after the company goes public?
a) Cash out
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b) Wait
c) Do not know
4. Suppose that waiting a month, until after the company goes public, would
result in a 50–50 chance that the money would be doubled to two million
dollars and a 50– 50 chance that it would be reduced by twenty percent, to
800 thousand dollars. Would you cash out immediately and take the one
million dollars, or wait until after the company goes public?
a) Cash out
b) Wait
c) Do not know
5. Suppose the chances were 50–50 that waiting would double your money to
two million dollars and 50–50 that it would reduce it by ten percent, to 900
thousand dollars. Would you cash out immediately and take the one million
dollars, or wait until after the company goes public?
a) Cash out
b) Wait
c) Do not know
Holt and Laury Task
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Figure A.2.: HL Decision Task
Decision Option A Option B
1 10% chance of $8 90% chance of $6.4 10% chance of $15.4 90% chance of $ 0.4
2 20% chance of $8 80% chance of $6.4 20% chance of $15.4 80% chance of $ 0.4
3 30% chance of $8 70% chance of $6.4 30% chance of $15.4 70% chance of $ 0.4
4 40% chance of $8 60% chance of $6.4 40% chance of $15.4 60% chance of $ 0.4
5 50% chance of $8 50% chance of $6.4 50% chance of $15.4 50% chance of $ 0.4
6 60% chance of $8 40% chance of $6.4 60% chance of $15.4 40% chance of $ 0.4
7 70% chance of $8 30% chance of $6.4 70% chance of $15.4 30% chance of $ 0.4
8 80% chance of $8 20% chance of $6.4 80% chance of $15.4 20% chance of $ 0.4
9 90% chance of $8 10% chance of $6.4 90% chance of $15.4 10% chance of $ 0.4
10 100% chance of $8 0% chance of $6.4 100% chance of $15.4 0% chance of $ 0.4
A.2. Additional Experimental Results
A.2.1. Relating the risk attitude elicitation tasks
Table A.1.: Gender di erences in the Inheritance Task
Male Female
Baseline Category 2.308*** 3.077***
(0.259) (0.305)
Treatment controls Yes Yes
Gender*treatment controls Yes Yes
Estimates of baseline category in linear regression onre-
categorized data. Robust standard. errors in brackets.
Males are lessrisk averse (p=0.06.)*** Significance at the
1 percent level.
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Table A.2.: Average Self-reported Risk Preferences
Male Female
Risk aversion 3.351 3.756
(1.078 ) (1.291 )
Loss aversion 3.621 4.090
(1.224) (1.291)
Males are significantly less risk averse
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, p =
0.04) and significantly less loss averse
(Wilcoxonrank sum test, p = 0.03.)
Standard deviations in brackets.
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Table A.3.: Relation Lottery Tasks and Risk Taking in Dospert Task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.29** 0.27** 0.67 0.35 0.08
(0.111) (0.112) (0.421) (0.434) (0.098)
Social context 1.13*** 1.13*** 1.13*** 0.29*** 0.28***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.082) (0.081)
Recreation context 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.38*** -0.38***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.087) (0.087)
Gambling context -0.96*** -0.96*** -0.96*** -1.28*** -1.28***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.101) (0.102)
Ethical context -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.79*** -0.79***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.062) (0.062)
Investment context 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** -0.50*** -0.51***
(0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.104) (0.104)
Social context -0.38** -0.38** -0.38** -0.17 -0.17
x male (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.110) (0.110)
Recreation context 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
x male (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.121) (0.121)
Gambling context 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22
x male (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.144) (0.144)
Ethics context -0.33** -0.33** -0.33** -0.23** -0.23**
x male (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.094) (0.094)
Investment context 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.32** 0.32**
x male (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.157) (0.157)
LLT positive -0.01 -0.01 -0.01**
domain (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
LLT negative -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
domain (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
LLT mixed 0.00 0.01 0.01
domain (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Inheritance task -0.03 0.00 0.00
(0.034) (0.046) (0.037)
LLT positive 0.01 0.02*
domain x male (0.014) (0.012)
LLT negative -0.01 -0.01
domain x male (0.013) (0.013)
LLT mixed -0.02 -0.02
domain x male (0.015) (0.013)
Inheritance task -0.06 -0.04
x male (0.077) (0.062)
Probability of high outcome 0.21*** 0.21***
(0.018) (0.018)
Value of low outcome -0.18*** -0.18***
(0.022) (0.022)
Prob of high outcome 1.63*** 1.62***
(0.091) (0.093)
Constant 2.38*** 2.70*** 2.56*** 2.32*** 2.24***
(0.069) (0.212) (0.244) (0.261) (0.130)
N 6400 6400 6400 6400 6400
Dependent Variable: Likelihood to take risk. Robust (clustered) standard errors in brackets.
***<0.001; **<0.05 *<0.01
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A.2.2. Relating personal characteristics
Table A.4.: Gender di erences in background characteristics
Characteristics Female Male
GAD 5.15*** 3.77***
(0.06) (0.04)
CRT 1.80*** 2.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
Risk numeracy 1.73*** 2.17***
(0.01) (0.01)
High exp. income 0.67*** 0.87***
(0.01) (0.00)
Optimist 0.82*** 0.92***
(0.00) (0.00)
Confidence 5.06*** 6.17***
(0.02) (0.02)
Lucky 0.66*** 0.79***
(0.01) (0.00)
Standard errors of means in parentheses *
significant at 10 percent; ** significant at
5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent
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Table A.5.: The e ect of personal characterstics on risk taking in the inheritance
task
Inheritance task
Male -0.713*
(0.404)
GAD 0.035
(0.026)
CRT -0.039
(0.123)
Risk Numeracy -0.195
(0.125)
High expected Income -0.056
(0.282)
Optimist 0.226
(0.323)
Lucky 0.174
(0.242)
Confidence -0.061
(0.074)
Constant 3.382***
(0.674)
Robust (clustered) standard errors in brackets. ***<0.001; **<0.05 *<0.01
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A.2.3. Lottery-based risk attitudes and the Dospert task by
context
Table A.6.: Lottery Tasks and Dospert by context, Part 1
Social context Gamble context Health context
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Male -0.09 -0.11 0.49 0.56 -0.11 0.49*** 0.48** 1.21 0.47 0.34** 0.29** 0.29** -0.90 -1.01 0.04
(0.082) (0.083) (0.501) (0.408) (0.075) (0.140) (0.146) (0.849) (0.762) (0.129) (0.111) (0.114) (0.720) (0.809) (0.097)
LLT positive -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.03* -0.04 -0.04* 0.01 0.01 0.02
domain (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.022) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013)
LLT negative 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02* -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
domain (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
LLT mixed 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
domain (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Inheritance task -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
(0.037) (0.058) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058) (0.061) (0.048) (0.056) (0.057)
LLT positive -0.03* -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
domain x male (0.015) (0.014) (0.031) (0.027) (0.023) (0.020)
LLT negative -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02
domain x male (0.017) (0.013) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
LLT mixed 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.01
domain x male (0.017) (0.015) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022)
Inheritance task -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 0.10 0.10
x male (0.078) (0.070) (0.129) (0.122) (0.108) (0.096)
Value of high outcome 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06* 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.038) (0.035) (0.047) (0.047)
Value of low outcome -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.11** -0.12** -0.24*** -0.24***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.052) (0.053) (0.045) (0.048)
Prob of high outcome 1.41*** 1.41*** 1.71*** 1.66*** 1.39*** 1.35***
(0.159) (0.163) (0.318) (0.324) (0.160) (0.164)
Constant 3.50*** 3.44*** 3.21*** 2.70*** 3.01*** 1.41*** 2.18*** 1.92*** 1.95*** 1.23*** 2.37*** 2.51*** 2.95*** 2.41*** 2.23***
(0.057) (0.249) (0.319) (0.274) (0.163) (0.085) (0.434) (0.490) (0.480) (0.270) (0.069) (0.345) (0.443) (0.435) (0.243)
N 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 640 640 640 640 640 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280
Dependent Variable: Likelihood to take risk. Robust (clustered) standard errors in brackets. ***<0.001; **<0.05 *<0.01
Table A.7.: Lottery Tasks and Dospert by context, Part 2
Ethical context Recreation context Investment context
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Male -0.04 -0.01 0.34 -0.00 -0.14* 0.34** 0.30** 1.22 1.08 0.08 0.52*** 0.38** 2.30** 1.49** 0.44***
(0.101) (0.104) (0.586) (0.569) (0.082) (0.141) (0.144) (0.815) (0.823) (0.108) (0.146) (0.152) (0.886) (0.717) (0.133)
LLT positive -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.04** -0.04*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03*
domain (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
LLT negative -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.00
domain (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016)
LLT mixed -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.02 0.05** 0.03
domain (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018)
Inheritance task 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.20** -0.08 -0.05
(0.049) (0.072) (0.058) (0.070) (0.093) (0.067) (0.060) (0.083) (0.072)
LLT positive 0.01 0.03* 0.04 0.04* 0.02 0.02
domain x male (0.017) (0.014) (0.027) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025)
LLT negative -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00
domain x male (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021)
LLT mixed -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04* -0.07** -0.06**
domain x male (0.021) (0.017) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029) (0.028)
Inheritance task -0.04 -0.01 -0.14 -0.10 -0.23* -0.17
x male (0.106) (0.084) (0.149) (0.102) (0.124) (0.109)
Value of high outcome 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.21*** 0.22***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Value of low outcome -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.03 -0.06
(0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039) (0.049) (0.055)
Prob of high outcome 1.40*** 1.35*** 1.88*** 1.87*** 2.07*** 2.10***
(0.156) (0.155) (0.185) (0.191) (0.220) (0.231)
Constant 1.87*** 2.02*** 1.89*** 1.75*** 1.85*** 2.41*** 3.33*** 3.03*** 1.32* 1.29*** 2.77*** 2.99*** 2.30*** 1.18** 1.01**
(0.073) (0.306) (0.389) (0.376) (0.163) (0.094) (0.459) (0.517) (0.736) (0.240) (0.102) (0.512) (0.602) (0.567) (0.335)
N 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280 640 640 640 640 640
Dependent Variable: Likelihood to take risk. Robust (clustered) standard errors in brackets. ***<0.001; **<0.05 *<0.01
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B. Appendix chapter 4
B.1. Information-based Model
We show that under certain conditions, evaluators will choose the higher-performing
candidate in joint but not in separate evaluation. In joint evaluation, they may
observe more counter-stereotypical candidates (e.g., women performing strongly and
men poorly in math) than in separate evaluation. The evaluator is either in a joint or
separate evaluation condition and has to choose a candidate for future performance.
The evaluator is informed of selected candidate(s)’ past performance and gender
(type), as well as the total size (and average performance of the candidate pool.
Each candidate i has a type g œ (m, f), and type m is believed to have higher
expected performance. We define xig as the observed past performance of candidate
i with type g, and let yig denote this candidate’s (un(known) future performance.
The total size of the candidate pool is known to be N = 2j with xim œ (x1...xj)
and xif œ (xj+1...x2j), reflecting a 50/50 distribution of types. The average previous
performance across types, i.e x¯ = 1N
mÿ
g=f
x¯g,is known. We denote x¯g as the (unknown)
average previous performance by gender. Evaluators know xg ≥ N(x¯g,‡2), with
known variance (‡2).
In joint evaluation, evaluators observe the performance of two candidates (i.e.,
they observe x = (xif xim)). Evaluators can choose between these candidates and
the random option with known expected performance of x¯.
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We denote evaluators’ prior expectation of y¯g as µg. Evaluators have no taste
for discrimination but hold stereotypical beliefs. Specifically, µm > µf , and because
of the 50/50 distribution and known x¯, we can write µm = x¯ + h,and µf = x¯ ≠ h
with h > 0 (assuming no learning of the task for candidates over time). Evalu-
ators’ prior beliefs about each type’s average future productivity look as follows:
◊g ≥ N(µg, ‹2), assuming equal, positive, and known variances across the genders.
Because of symmetry, we have (|◊g ≠ x¯|) ≥ N(h, ‹2).
We assume that evaluators are risk-neutral expected-value maximizers and that
the expected future performance (yig) is a linear combination of the observed pre-
vious performance of the candidate and the (updated) belief about the candidate’s
performance based on gender; i.e., E(yig|x) = –xig + (1≠–)µg(.|x) with 0 < – < 1.
After observing x, evaluators update beliefs on according to Bayes rule, to the
posterior distribution of µg(.|x) over ◊g. An evaluator in separate evaluation con-
fronted with a below-average male candidate (i.e. with xm = b) will update beliefs
about mean performance for males in the pool to: µm(.|x) = (x¯ + h|xim)) =
b+ ‡2‡2+‹2 (h+ (¯x+ b)).
If faced with an average female candidate (i.e. with xf = µ), an evaluator will
update beliefs about the mean performance of females in the pool to: µf (.|x) =
(x¯≠ h|xif )) = x¯≠ ‡2‡2+‹2h.
In joint evaluation, evaluators have two data points available; they use both the
male and the female candidates’ past performance to update their prior of h. In
the counter-stereotypical situation where an evaluator is confronted with a lower-
performing male (xm = b) and a higher-performing female candidate (xf = µ), this
results in updated beliefs of mean performance for males in the pool of: µm(.|x) =
(x¯+ h|xim, xif )) = (x¯+h)‡2+‹2 (¯x+b)‡2+2‹2 .
It results in an updated mean for females in the pool of:µf (.|x) = (x¯≠h|xim, xif )) =
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(x¯≠h)‡2+‹2((2x¯≠b)+x¯)
‡2+2‹2 .
The evaluator will compare the updated expected future performance E(yig|x) of
the candidates with the expected value of the random option (x¯) and choose the
option with the highest expected performance. To have a situation where evaluators
prefer a high-performing female in a joint evaluation setting over a low-performing
male and the random option, but prefer the random option over the high-performing
female in the separate evaluation setting, the following conditions need to simulta-
neously hold:
1. The expected future performance of a higher-performing female candidate
dominates the random option.
2. The expected future performance of a higher-performing female candidate
dominates the lower-performing male option in joint evaluation, and
3. The expected future performance of a higher-performing female candidate is
lower than the expected value of the random option in the separate treatment.
If h‡2‹2 < (x¯≠ b) these conditions hold:
1. (1≠ –) ú x¯+ – ú (x¯≠h)‡2+‹2((2x¯≠b)+x¯)‡2+2‹2 > x¯.
2. (1≠ –) ú x¯+ – ú (x¯≠h)‡2+‹2((2x¯≠b)+x¯)‡2+2‹2 > (1≠ –) ú b+ – ú (x¯+h)‡
2+‹2(x¯+b)
‡2+2‹2 .
3. x¯ > (1≠ –) ú x¯+ – ú (x¯≠ h‡2‡2+‹2 )
Thus, whenever there is su cient variance of the expected di erence between male
and female performance, there is enough counter-stereotypical evidence, and eval-
uators are not too biased, the joint-separate reversal can be observed. For the
parameters used in the experiment, the condition reduces to h‡2 < ‹2.
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B.2. Experimental Instructions
B.2.1. Instructions stage 1
All treatments were programmed in Z-tree. (Fischbacher 2000) We include as an
example our instructions for the math task (inspired by Niederle and Vesterlund
2007), instructions for the word task were similar and are available upon request.
Welcome!
In this experiment you are asked to correctly solve as many math problems as
possible. In each problem, you are asked to sum up five two-digit numbers.
For each correct answer you will receive 25 cents. There will be three rounds;
each round consists of 15 problems. You have five minutes available for each round.
Before we begin with the experiment there will be a practice round where you can
get used to the task.
At the end of the experiment, you will receive an overview of the number of correct
answers and of your total payo . An example of this task is given in the figure below.
After performing the task, participants filled out a questionnaire collecting demo-
graphic information.
B.2.2. Instructions Stage 2
These were the instructions for the joint treatment with the math task and a higher
performing female candidate and a low performing male. Instructions for the other
treatments were similar and are available upon request.
Welcome!
You are participating in a study in which you will earn some money. The amount
will depend on a choice that you will have to make below. At the end of the study,
your earnings (1 point = $ 1) will be added to a show-up fee, and you will be paid
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in cash.
Figure B.1.: Lottery List Decision Task
Your Choice.
Another group of study participants has participated in two rounds of a task
before this session. You will receive information on two of the participants, person
A and person B and on how well they performed in Round 1. You will then have
to decide whether you want to be paid according to the Round 2 performance of
person A, person B or of a randomly selected person from the pool of participants.
Information on Task
In a previous study, participants were shown rows of five two-digit numbers. Par-
ticipants had to add up the numbers of each row. Participants were asked and
incentivized to add up as many rows as possible as possible. They had five minutes
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available for each round of the task. While the task was otherwise identical, they
saw di erent sequences containing di erent numbers in Rounds 1 and 2.
Their point score was calculated as follows: For every correctly added sequence
they received one point. Sequences that were not correctly added received no points.
To have a better understanding of the task, please click on this button to see a
sample task (SAMPLE TASK)
Information on Average Round-1 Performance of all Study Participants
On average participants scored 10 points in Round 1.
Information on Persons.
You will be paid according to the Round 2-performance of one of the two study
participants described below, Person A or Person B, or a study participant drawn at
random from all the people who participated in the study. We had 40 male and 40
female students participate, recruited by the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory.
Person A Person B
Student Student
American American
Female Male
Caucasian Caucasian
Performance Indicator: In Performance Indicator: In
Round 1 the person scored Round 1 the person scored
10 points in 5 minutes 9 points in 5 minutes
Procedure to Determine your Earnings.
Once you have decided whether you want to be paid based on the performance
of person A, person B or a randomly selected person and have completed a short
questionnaire, we will inform you of their point score and your payo s.
If you chose to be paid according to the performance of one of the persons de-
scribed above, you will receive $1 x that person’s point score for Round 2.
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If you chose to be paid according to the performance of a random person, you will
receive $1 x the random person’s point score for Round 2.
For example if your chosen person scores 2 points in round 2, you will receive $2.
If you have any questions, please press the help button now. Once we have
addressed all questions, we will move to the main question of this study.
Main question: Do you want to be paid based on the Round 2-performance of
one of the persons described above, or do you want to be paid based on the Round
2-performance of a person drawn at random from all the people who participated in
the study? (Please check one box)
NOTE: THE AVERAGE SCORE IN ROUND 1 WAS 10 POINTS
Person A Person B Random Draw
Student Student
American American
Female Male
Caucasian Caucasian
Performance Indicator: In Performance Indicator: In
Round 1 the person scored Round 1 the person scored
10 points in 5 minutes 9 points in 5 minutes
Note: after the main question of the experiment participants were notified of the
score of the randomly selected candidate, the score of person A, and the score of
person B.
Additional Decision.
Please choose Option A or Option B in all ten paired lottery-choice decisions
below (select your preferred option in each row). One of the pairs will be chosen at
random, the lottery will be conducted and you will be paid according to the outcome
of your preferred choice.
For example, if PAIR 1 (first row) is randomly chosen, and your preferred option
is A, we will conduct a lottery where the chance of winning $2 is 1/10 (1 blue ball
in an urn containing 10 balls) and the chance of winning $1.6 is 9/10 (9 green balls
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in the urn). If the blue ball is picked, you will receive $2. If the green ball is picked,
you will receive $1.6.
Figure B.2.: HL Decision Task
Decision Option A Option B
1 10% chance of $8 90% chance of $6.4 10% chance of $15.4 90% chance of $ 0.4
2 20% chance of $8 80% chance of $6.4 20% chance of $15.4 80% chance of $ 0.4
3 30% chance of $8 70% chance of $6.4 30% chance of $15.4 70% chance of $ 0.4
4 40% chance of $8 60% chance of $6.4 40% chance of $15.4 60% chance of $ 0.4
5 50% chance of $8 50% chance of $6.4 50% chance of $15.4 50% chance of $ 0.4
6 60% chance of $8 40% chance of $6.4 60% chance of $15.4 40% chance of $ 0.4
7 70% chance of $8 30% chance of $6.4 70% chance of $15.4 30% chance of $ 0.4
8 80% chance of $8 20% chance of $6.4 80% chance of $15.4 20% chance of $ 0.4
9 90% chance of $8 10% chance of $6.4 90% chance of $15.4 10% chance of $ 0.4
10 100% chance of $8 0% chance of $6.4 100% chance of $15.4 0% chance of $ 0.4
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